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INTRODUCTION

In a wide variety of contexts, aliens have challenged U.S. government
actions undertaken outside our territorial limits. Iraqi and Afghan citizens
allegedly tortured while detained by the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan
have sought damages for violations of their constitutional rights;' aliens
subjected to extraordinary rendition-the transfer of detainees by U.S. officials
to countries where they are detained and tortured-have asserted various
constitutional claims; 2 and foreign nationals detained by the U.S. military at
Bagram Airfield Military Base in Afghanistan have filed petitions for habeas
corpus.
The Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush decisively
rejected the Bush administration's categorical argument that constitutional
rights do not apply to governmental actions taken against aliens beyond our
borders and instead adopted a functional approach to the extraterritorial
application of the Constitution. The Court concluded that "questions of
extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not
formalism."A Whether a constitutional provision has extraterritorial effect must
be determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the "'particular
circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives which
Congress had before it,' and, in particular, whether judicial enforcement of the
provision would be 'impracticable and anomalous."' 5 Applying that functional
test to detainees held at Guantanamo, the Court found habeas review necessary
because (1) the procedural protections afforded the detainees were inadequate;
(2) "in every practical sense Guantanamo is not abroad;" and (3) there were
few, if any, practical barriers to federal courts' exercise of habeas jurisdiction. 6
While the Boumediene decision has been viewed by some as broadly
reflecting the Court's march toward a global or more cosmopolitan
Constitution, its import and application remain unclear. 7 In subsequent cases,
1.
In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007).
2.
Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), af'd, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir.
2008), vacated andsuperseded on reh'gen banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009); EI-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F.
Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff'd sub nom. EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
3.
Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009), rev'd, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir.
2010); Wazir v. Gates, 629 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009).
4.
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008).
5.
Id at 759 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74-75 (1957)).
6.
Id at 767-70.
7.
David D. Cole, Rights Over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and Guantanamo
Bay, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 47; Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March ofJudicial
Cosmopolitanism,2008 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 23, 35-38.
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the government has argued that Boumediene was premised on Guantanamo's
unique status as de facto sovereign territory that in every practical sense is "not
abroad," and therefore cannot be applied to other prisoners detained by the
United States in Afghanistan, Iraq, or CIA sites around the globe.8 The
government also has successfully asserted in several D.C. Circuit cases after
Boumediene that the Court's decision only applies to habeas petitions and
leaves unaffected the circuit's prior law that Fifth Amendment rights do not
apply to aliens anywhere abroad, even those detained at Guantanamo.9 While it
is unlikely that the government's attempt to cabin Boumediene so narrowly will
succeed, the Court's functional balancing test has been criticized as vague,
malleable, and policy oriented.' 0 Most recently, the D.C. Circuit applied
Boumediene's functional test to deny prisoners held at Bagram Airfield
Military Base in Afghanistan a right to seek habeas relief, leading to editorial
criticism that the court had permitted what the Supreme Court had refused to
countenance at Guantanamo-"a legal black hole"" or "law-free zone"' 2-and
had affirmed an "extravagant claim of executive power."' 3
This Article argues that Boumediene's functional test, which focuses the
inquiry of whether the Suspension Clause applies to an executive detention
abroad primarily on practical concerns, is in considerable tension with the
fundamental norms jurisprudence that underlies and pervades the Court's
opinion. The Court's functional test is disconnected from its ringing
pronouncements that the writ of habeas corpus is a "fundamental" bulwark in
protecting liberty, "a right of first importance," and "an indispensable
mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers.""4 While the Court
claimed that the writ's indispensable separation of powers function was central
to its analysis of the extraterritorial application of the Suspension Clause,' 5
Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting the government's argument
8.
that Boumediene has no application to territories not subject to the de facto sovereignty of the United
States); Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, 9-10, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No.
09-5265) (on file with author) (recording the government's view that Guantanamo was "unique" and
Boumediene only covers places where the United States has de facto sovereignty, which means "total
plenary control"); Replacement Brief for John Ashcroft, The Official Capacity Defendants-Appellees
and the United States at 52, Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 06-4216-CV), vacated
and supersededon reh'g en banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026-27 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing numerous
9.
precedential cases in holding that "the due process clause does not apply to aliens without property or
presence in the sovereign territory of the United States"), vacated as moot, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010); see
also Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009) (noting
that "the Court in Boumediene disclaimed any intention to disturb existing law governing the
extraterritorial reach of any constitutional provisions, other than the Suspension Clause").
10. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 842-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the functional test
as an "inherently subjective" test, which will never "provide clear guidance for the future"); GERALD L.
NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 113-17 (1996); Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient
Constitution? ExtraterritorialityAfter Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2009); Gerald L.
Neuman, The ExtraterritorialConstitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 273
(2009) (claiming that the functional approach "suffers from the lack of certainty" but asking whether
there is any alternative).
11. Editorial, Bagram: A Legal Black Hole?, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 2010, at A20.
12. Editorial, Backward at Bagram, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2010, at A26.
13. Id.
14. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798.
15. Id. at 765-66.
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nowhere does the test the Court articulates acknowledge the importance of
separation of powers principles. So too, while the Court continuously
emphasized the detainees' interest in avoiding lengthy, prolonged, and
indefinite confinement without adequate due process protections, that
fundamental interest makes no appearance in the Court's functional test. Justice
Kennedy's opinion in Boumediene thus resembles his decision in Lawrence v.
Texas in that both are strongly premised on a fundamental norms jurisprudence
that is untethered from the specific test used to decide the case.
This Article seeks to reintegrate the fundamental norms strands of the
Boumediene opinion into its functional test, and thus normatively ground the
opinion. It does so by arguing that the functional test should be informed by
international law, a consideration that the Boumediene decision omitted from
its analysis despite briefing by the petitioners and amici arguing that
international law supported the application of habeas.' 7 While several
commentators have supported applying international law's jurisdictional
principles to address the practical concerns underlying the functional test,'" this
Article argues that utilizing international law's substantive, fundamental,
nonderogable norms to help determine the Constitution's extraterritorial
application would both allay the Court's practical concerns and ground the
Court's test on the important normative principles that underlie its Boumediene
opinion.
The argument made here is premised on international law's post-World
War II recognition that certain basic norms of civilized society, such as the
prohibitions on torture, genocide, slavery, extrajudicial execution, and
prolonged arbitrary detention without any judicial review' 9 are so fundamental
as to be nonderogable under any circumstances. That certain norms are so
central to individual dignity and civilized society that, unlike ordinary
proscriptions, they can never be disregarded by any government at any time,
finds expression in several contemporary international law concepts and terms.
For example, the International Court of Justice has referred to "fundamental" or
"peremptory" norms of international law, and the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties provides that governments have no power to enter into treaties
that conflict with a peremptory-or jus cogens-norm, which it defines as "a
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted." 20

16. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas:
The "FundamentalRight" That DareNot Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1916-17 (2004).
17. Neuman, supra note 10, at 276-77, 277 n. 101; see, e.g., Brief for United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196).
18. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, EmbeddedInternationalLaw and the Constitution Abroad,
110 COLUM. L. REv. 225 (2010); Cole, supra note 7; Note, The ExtraterritorialConstitution and the
InterpretiveRelevance ofInternationalLaw, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1908 (2008).
19.

The authoritative RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

§ 702

cmt. n &

n. II (1987) lists these norms as jus cogens norms that are not subject to derogation even in emergency
situations.
20. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see
also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 6, f 64
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The use of such "fundamental," "peremptory," "jus cogens" norms to
inform the applicability of the Constitution's provisions to U.S. officials'
conduct abroad would address the tension between perceived U.S. foreign
policy needs and the recognition that there are certain fundamental principles
that the government should never violate wherever it acts. Such a normative
approach follows from the Court's decisions in the Insular Cases as well as
Justices Harlan's and Frankfurter's opinions in Reid v. Covert,21 and is
consistent with the line of cases, including Johnson v. Eisentrager,22 that
Justice Kennedy relied on in Boumediene. Moreover, the use of international
law in this manner to determine not the content of constitutional rights but
rather their territorial applicability avoids the primary objections raised to the
use of international law to help determine the Constitution's meaning
domestically. 2 3 Finally, the determination by the international community,
including the United States, that certain conduct is never justified by practical
concerns, and the prohibition of such conduct in every nation in the world,
should meet the concerns for flexibility and practicality at the root of the
"impractical and anomalous" functional test.
Part II of the Article demonstrates how Justice Kennedy's functional test
sought to negotiate a compromise between an all-or-nothing view of the
Constitution's extraterritorial application to aliens abroad. It argues, however,
that Kennedy's compromise formulation is in considerable tension with the
fundamental norms jurisprudence underlying the opinion, and is ultimately
based on an unprincipled and erroneous separation of the domestic arena from
the international order. Part III traces the development of Kennedy's
impractical and anomalous test from the cases he relied upon, illustrating that
those cases emphasize not merely practicalities, but the fundamental norms of
civilized society in determining when constitutional norms apply abroad. Those
decisions are, at minimum, consistent with using international law to inform
that determination. Part IV argues that judicial use of fundamental,
nonderogable norms of international law to inform the Constitution's
extraterritorial application is consistent with principles of modern international
law, the intent and practice of the Framers, and modern judicial precedent. Part
V explores the use of international law by other legal systems-Canada, the
United Kingdom, and the European Court of Human Rights-to determine the
reach of constitutional or human rights.
Finally, Part VI applies the theoretical framework set forth in Part IV to
two important cases currently before the courts. The first case is the recent
decision of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denying prisoners
detained for many years at the U.S. Bagram military base in Afghanistan a right
(Feb. 3); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
M 100, 188 (June 27); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1979 I.C.J.
7, IM38-40 (Dec. 15).
21. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
22. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
23. See Neuman, supra note 10, at 275-76 (suggesting that the majority in Boumediene was
worried about invoking international or comparative practice in support of its position because such a
methodology has provoked vigorous objections in the past).
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to seek writs of habeas corpus.24 The district court decision, the oral argument
in the court of appeals, and the ultimate appellate decision were, in significant
part, devoted to an analysis of the extent and nature of U.S. control over the
base and its location within a war zone. 25 Yet the question of whether the
United States can indefinitely detain those who claim to be innocent civiliansperhaps for the rest of their lives-without meaningful due process or any
judicial review, should not turn on the particular characteristics or location of
the secure military facility at which the government chooses to detain them.
The D.C. Circuit's analysis of the functional test factors did not consider the
length of detention, although the prolonged detention of the Guantanamo
prisoners without adequate process was clearly an important concern
motivating the Supreme Court in Boumediene. Under the analysis suggested
here, the court should have strongly considered whether the prohibition of
prolonged executive detention without judicial process is a fundamental norm
of international law in determining whether the writ of habeas corpus was
available to the Bagram detainees.
Secondly, the D.C. Circuit has shown no inclination post-Boumediene to
revisit its holding that an alien abroad is not afforded constitutional protection
from torture by United States officials, and the Supreme Court has refused to
grant certiorari in recent cases raising that question.26 Since the prohibition
against torture is clearly a fundamental, nonderogable norm of international
law, the analysis presented here should lead courts to conclude that the
constitutional proscription against torture applies to United States governmental
actions abroad.
II.

BOUMEDIENE's COMPROMISE: THE TENSION BETWEEN PRACTICALITIES
AND PRINCIPLES

A.

Competing ConstitutionalTheories ofExtraterritoriality

The question of whether and to what extent the Constitution applies to
U.S. government action abroad has historically oscillated between several
broad, competing perspectives. The first views the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights as reflecting a social compact between the government and the people,
in which the people grant the government certain powers in return for
protection and rights.27 This perspective underlay Justice Rehnquist's opinion
24. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
25. Id; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8; Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205
(D.D.C. 2009), rev'd, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
26. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009)
(dismissing damage claims alleging torture brought by ex-Guantanamo detainees, suggesting that the
court must adhere to prior circuit law unless it explicitly conflicts with Supreme Court precedent, but
ultimately resting its holding on qualified immunity); see also Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 102627 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that the court is required to follow past circuit precedent denying that
constitutional rights other than the right to habeas corpus apply to aliens abroad), judgment vacated on
other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010).
27. See generally NEUMAN, supra note 10, at 54-55 (discussing the social compact theory,
including Federalist arguments that, because aliens were not party to the compact, the compact did not
confer any rights onto them and did not bind them to the performance of specific duties); Louis Henkin,
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for the Court in United States v. Verdugo- Urquidez, in which the Court held the

Fourth Amendment inapplicable to a search of an alien's home in Mexico
because
"the people" protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second
Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this
country to be considered part of that community.28

Undertones of social compact theory also pervade Justice Jackson's
Eisentragerdecision holding that enemy aliens held abroad had no right to a

writ of habeas corpus.2 9 The social contract theory is closely allied with a strict
territorial view of the Constitution's applicability, articulated by the Supreme
Court most starkly in its sweeping declaration in In re Ross that the
Constitution established a government for the United States and not for
countries outside of its limits, and that therefore "[t]he Constitution can have no
operation in another country." 30
A far broader, more alien-protective perspective that is ultimately derived
from a social contract understanding of the Constitution's scope is what
Professor Gerald Neuman has termed the "mutuality of legal obligation"
approach, 31 articulated most forcefully in Justice Brennan's dissent in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez3 2 and Neuman's own scholarly work.33 Justice
Brennan relied, in part, on "basic notions of mutuality" to support the
application of the Fourth Amendment to a search of an alien's residence in
Mexico. 34 To Brennan, Verdugo-Urquidez was "entitled to the protections of
the Fourth Amendment because our Government, by investigating him and
attempting to hold him accountable under United States criminal laws, has
treated him as a member of our community for purposes of enforcing our laws.
He has become, quite literally, one of the governed."3 5 While the mutuality
approach thus expands the national community to include persons the
The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 11 (1985) (describing the social compact approach); Jules Lobel, The Constitution
Abroad, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 871 (1989) (same).
28. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1980). Justice Rehnquist described
the dissent from the court of appeals as "view[ing] the Constitution as a 'compact' among the people of
the United States." Id. at 264. He also argued that the "purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect
the people of the United States against arbitrary action by their own Government; it was never suggested
that the provision was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside
of the United States territory." Id. at 266.
29. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769-72 (1950) (stating that the government's
obligation to protect correlates with the duty of loyalty). Various scholars have also articulated versions
of the social compact theory. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 7, at 43-46; Paul B. Stephan III,
ConstitutionalLimits on InternationalRendition of CriminalSuspects, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 777, 783-84
(1980).
30. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (holding that "[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in
pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens").
31. NEUMAN, supra note 10, at 7.
32. 494 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. NEUMAN, supra note 10, at 7-8.
34. Verdugo-Urquidez,494 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35. Id.
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government seeks to impose our law on, it fundamentally derives from the
social contract premise that constitutional rights only affix to members of our
national community-either broadly or narrowly conceived.
The main difficulty with the compact approach is that it removes any
constitutional limits whatsoever on the government's powers to act against the
class of aliens who can be viewed as outside the social contract. For example,
the D.C. Circuit has held that even an alleged government conspiracy to torture
an alien abroad was outside of the Constitution's purview under the doctrine
enunciated in Verdugo-Urquidez and other cases.36 More recent claims of
torture by U.S. officials abroad have met the same fate in the D.C. Circuit.3 7
While the alien still can claim the protection of customary international law and
treaties that proscribe certain governmental action, those sources of law have
generally proven unenforceable in U.S. courts against U.S. governmental
38
action. Under our prevailing dualist model, the alien is generally left to seek
protection through international protest and diplomacy, an often futile remedy
that is particularly weak where the alien's country of origin either has little
political leverage or doesn't even support the alien's claim. 39
The competing categorical perspective to the social compact theory is a
universalist theory of the Constitution, in which any U.S. government action,
wherever and against whomever it takes place, is subject to all the limits
imposed by the Constitution. Justice Black's plurality opinion in Reid
suggested a universalist position that the government is a "creature of the
Constitution," and "can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed
by the Constitution.AO Although Reid only dealt with the rights of citizens
abroad, not aliens,41 one could read into Black's opinion the view that every
provision of the Constitution must always be deemed applicable to U.S.
government actions abroad.42
While the universalist position has adherents in the academy,4 3 it finds
36. Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 602-04 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002).
37. In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007).
38. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504-05 (2008) (holding that non-self-executing
international treaties are unenforceable absent implementing legislation); Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d
109, 119 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiffs claims raised under the non-self-executing Convention
Against Torture are unenforceable absent implementation through a domestic statute).
39. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (stating that the prisoners could not rely
on the Geneva Conventions in their habeas action).
40. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957).
41. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 263-70 (1990) (distinguishing Reid as
based on citizenship, whereas Verdugo-Urquidez was an alien). Indeed, in Eisentrager,Justice Black
recognized in dissent that he would not agree with the proposition "that this nation either must or should
attempt to apply every constitutional provision of the Bill of Rights in controlling temporarily occupied
countries." 339 U.S. at 796-97 (Black, J., dissenting).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1988)
(reading Reid and scholarly opinion to the effect that the "'Bill of Rights controls the activities of U.S.
law enforcement officers wherever they occur"' (quoting Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Reach ofthe Bill of
Rights Beyond the Terra Firma ofthe United States, 20 VA. J. INT'L L., 741, 745 (1980)), rev'd, 494 U.S.
259 (1990); see also Reid, 354 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I cannot agree with the suggestion
that every provision of the Constitution must always be deemed automatically applicable to American
citizens in every part of the world.").
43. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 27; Lobel, supra note 27; Timothy Zick, Constitutional
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little judicial support." The Ninth Circuit's majority opinion in VerdugoUrquidez suggested a universalist position,45 as did the court of appeals
decision in Eisentrager.46 So did Justice Brennan's dissent in VerdugoUrquidez in the Supreme Court,47 although Brennan mainly relied on the
mutuality of obligation approach.
The mainstream judicial hostility to the universalist approach is premised
primarily on the practical fear of overly constraining the political branches'
ability to conduct U.S. foreign policy. As Justice Rehnquist stated in VerdugoUrquidez, "For better or for worse, we live in a world of nation-states in which
our Government must be able to 'function effectively in the company of
sovereign nations."'4 To the Court in Verdugo-Urquidez, restrictions on U.S.
government actions responding to threats to important American interests
around the globe must be imposed by the political branches through diplomacy,
treaty, or legislation, not by judicial application of the Constitution.
Throughout American history, however, those practical concerns have
competed with the recognition that, even if the entire Constitution did not apply
to aliens in certain situations, there must be some fundamental constitutional
principles that restrain governmental conduct. As James Madison put it in the
context of protesting the treatment of resident non-enemy aliens, "If aliens had
no rights under the Constitution, they might not only be banished, but ... even
capitally punished, without a jury or the other incidents to a fair trial.'4 9
Similarly, Henry Clay, Speaker of the House of Representatives, claimed in
1819 that General Andrew Jackson's execution of two British citizens in
Spanish territory was beyond the Executive's constitutional authority, denying
that "any commander-in-chief, in this country, had this absolute power of life
and death, at his sole discretion."50 More recently, in response to a question
from Justice Stevens as to the constitutional rights of unadmitted aliens-who
generally are accorded little or no constitutional protection-the Deputy
Solicitor General admitted that while the government can summarily exclude
such an alien, it couldn't just "shoot him."51 Or as Justice Brown put it in a

Displacement, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 515, 589-606 (2009) (arguing for a more universal application of
the Constitution not dependent on geography or territoriality).
44. NEUMAN, supranote 10, at 6.
45.
Verdugo-Urquidez,856 F.2d at 1218.
46. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 963-65 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd sub nom. Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
47. Justice Brennan argued in Verdugo-Urquidez that "[o]ur national interest is defined by
those [constitutional] values and by the need to preserve our own just institutions. We take pride in our
commitment to a Government that cannot, on mere whim, break down doors and invade the most
personal of places." 494 U.S. at 285-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. Id.at 275 (quoting Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958)).
49. James Madison, Virginia Resolutions of 1798, reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528, 556 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1996).
50. 33 ANNALSOF CONG. 643, 645 (1819) [hereinafter ANNALS].
Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) (No. 03-878).
51.
The entire exchange between Justice Stevens and Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler is reprinted in
Jeffrey Kahn, Zoya's StandingProblem, or, When Should the ConstitutionFollow the Flag?, 108 MICH.
L. REV. 673, 716-17 (2005).
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1901 case, even if the Constitution did not generally apply to inhabitants of
certain territories controlled by the United States, it was not true that those
individuals had "no [constitutional] rights which [Congress] was bound to
respect."5 2
B.

Kennedy's Boumediene Compromise andIts Contradictions

Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Boumediene rejected both a
universalist position that habeas corpus applies whenever the U.S. government
detains someone anywhere in the world and the social compact view articulated
by Justice Scalia in dissent that "aliens abroad have no substantive rights under
our Constitution."53 Kennedy followed his concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez,
where he had rejected the social compact theory:
Though it must be beyond dispute that persons outside the United States did not
and could not assent to the Constitution, that is quite irrelevant to any
construction of the powers conferred or the limitations imposed by it. ...
... The force of the Constitution is not confined because it was brought into
being by certain persons who gave their immediate assent to its terms. 54
In Boumediene, Kennedy argued that when the government acts abroad
against aliens or citizens, its powers are not "'absolute and unlimited,"' but are
subject "'to such restrictions as are expressed in the Constitution."' 55 But for
Kennedy and the Court, the acceptance of that principle is simply a starting
point, because the real question is which constitutional limitations, restrictions,
and standards apply to particular governmental actions against aliens abroad.56
To determine which constitutional provisions are applicable in what
contexts, the Boumediene Court adopted a "functional approach," in which the
question turned on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism. In
Part IV of the opinion, Justice Kennedy traced a history of the development of

the functional test, in which the recognition, articulated by the Court in the
Insular Cases, that the Constitution always applies to government action must
be tempered by the practical "difficulties inherent in that position."" For
Kennedy, the Insular Cases recognized the "inherent practical difficulties of
enforcing all constitutional provisions 'always and everywhere.' 5 8 So too,
Kennedy relied on Harlan's and Frankfurter's concurrences in Reid for the
proposition that practical considerations were decisive in deciding whether a

52. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 283 (1901).
53. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 842, 848 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 276 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
55. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765 (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885)).
56. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Balzac v. Porto Rico,
258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922); Downes, 182 U.S. at 292 (White, J., concurring) ("In the case of the
territories, as in every other instance, when a provision of the Constitution is invoked, the question
which arises is, not whether the Constitution is operative, for that is self-evident, but whether the
provision relied on is applicable.").
57. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 757.
58. Id. at 759 (quoting Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312).

2011]

FundamentalNorms, InternationalLaw

317

jury trial was required in that case,59 and read the Court's Eisentragerdecision
as seeking to balance the practical "constraints of military occupation with
constitutional necessities.60
The Boumediene functional compromise based on practical difficulties is
in considerable tension with the separation of powers concerns that the Court
claimed were central to its opinion. For example, the Court stated that if the
extraterritorial application of the writ of habeas corpus turned on the
government's formalistic sovereignty-based test, "it would be possible for the
political branches to govern without legal constraint." 61 To do so would allow
for a "striking anomaly in our tripartite system of government, leading to a
regime in which Congress and the President, not this Court, say 'what the law
is,"' and "switch the Constitution on or off at will." 6 2 But the Court's functional
test permits and indeed encourages the government to do just that. If the
government learns the lessons of Boumediene, it will hold prisoners in the
future in, or as close to, an active war zone as possible, on a military base that
the United States controls temporarily (even if for years) and not permanently,
and where the practical obstacles to holding habeas hearings are potentially
most severe. Indeed, in the Bagram case, the government argued that practical
obstacles bar habeas review where the rilitary has transferred a detainee
captured in a non-war zone to a military facility located in an area of active
military combat. The circuit court adopted the government's position, at least
where the petitioners cannot prove that the location of detention was
deliberately chosen to avoid judicial review.64 If the government is correct,
practical obstacles to review would allow the Executive to operate in a law-free
zone, and the functional test would lead to long-term detentions outside of the
Court's purview.65
Indeed, the Court's three-factor functional test for determining the reach
of the Suspension Clause virtually ignores the separation of powers concerns
that purportedly were crucial to its analysis. 66 The Court claims to have drawn
67
But Eisentrager never
on the factors the Court relied on in Eisentrager.
mentioned the centrality of habeas corpus as an indispensable or essential
mechanism for policing separation of powers. Indeed Eisentrageronly referred
to separation of powers once, and then merely to note that the judiciary ought
59. Id. at 760.
60. Id. at 762.
61. Id. at 765.
62. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
63. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 228-29 (D.D.C. 2009), rev'd, 605 F.3d 84
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
64. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 98-99 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (rejecting detainees' argument
that, by transferring them from non-war zones to a war zone, the Executive could manipulate the
applicability of the Constitution on the grounds that that factor is not addressed in the Boumediene test
and that there was no evidence that the Executive "deliberately confined the detainees in the theater of
war").
65. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 843 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing a tension between the
Court's "rationale and rule," because the rule would seem to lead to executive detentions without
judicial review while the rationale would seem to preclude such a result).
66. Id. at 739, 742-43, 765-66.
67. Id. at 766.
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not entertain challenges to the legality, wisdom, or propriety of the
Commander-in-Chief's decision to send armed forces abroad. 8 As Judge Tatel
pointed out at oral argument in the Bagram case, the test articulated in
Boumediene does not appear to contemplate consideration of the very
separation of powers concerns that motivated the decision.69
Moreover, the Boumediene Court's use of pragmatic considerations to
determine that a constitutional right does not apply abroad is at odds with
traditional constitutional jurisprudence. As commentators have noted,
pragmatic considerations normally enter constitutional analysis to determine
how to apply and enforce a right, and not whether the right is applicable at all.70
While courts routinely utilize balancing tests to determine whether an
applicable right or constitutional limitation has been violated,7 and often rely
on pragmatic considerations to bolster their interpretations of text, history and
precedent,72 it is unusual for a court to use pragmatic, policy considerations as
the primary metric for determining whether constitutional principles should be
applicable to a given situation.73
C.

The Normative Premise of the Boumediene Functional
Compromise: The Separation of Foreign Affairs from Domestic
Policy

The Court's position in Boumediene that pragmatic considerations should
68. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950). Only Justice Black in dissent pointed
out the importance of habeas corpus as an instrument to protect against illegal imprisonment in our
constitutional scheme. Id. at 797-98 (Black, J., dissenting).
69. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 44, 49, 51 (noting that the Boumediene
functional test factors do not appear to take into account potential executive manipulation of the location
of detention).
70. NEUMAN, supra note 10, at 115 (stating that the concern that the federal government not
be bound by impractical restraints can be accommodated in extraterritorial situations, as it already is in
domestic situations, by a contextual assessment of factors); see also Burnett, supra note 10 (criticizing
the pragmatic approach that the Court has taken when determining the threshold question of whether a
constitutional provision is applicable in a domestic setting, when the Court has taken practical
considerations into account solely for purposes of determining how to enforce the provisions it has held
applicable); Lobel, supra note 27, at 871, 877-78 (stating that courts can articulate rights and balance
requirements of justice with legitimate national security needs); David A. Martin, Agora (Continued):
Military Commissions Act of 2006: JudicialReview andthe Military Commissions Act: On Striking the
Right Balance, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 344, 360 (2007) ("[C]onstitutional rights apply, but they may apply
in different ways, with different precise outcomes or applications, to noncitizens encountering U.S.
authority outside the country.").
71. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 203 (1990) (discussing the
balancing test used for analyzing the "negative" Commerce Clause); S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S.
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 n.16 (1987) (holding that a balancing test is the appropriate
standard for regulating commercial speech and for time, place, and manner restrictions); Bd. of Airport
Comm'rs of City of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 572 (1987) (describing the free speech tests
used for public, limited public, and nonpublic forums as balancing tests).
72. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 690-99 (1998) (using pragmatic policy balancing to
show that even if precedent was not dispositive of the issue of whether the Self-Incrimination Clause of
the Fifth Amendment was applicable to a foreign prosecution-which the Court believed it was-the
petitioner had not shown that balancing the competing interests would favor his claim); McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 51, 56-59 (1973).
73. Burnett, supra note 10. Compare Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), with
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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determine not only how to apply constitutional limitations to overseas U.S.
actions against aliens, but also whether those limitations apply at all is thus at
odds with traditional constitutional jurisprudence, a tension which requires
some normative explanation. Kennedy's Boumediene compromise is likely
normatively rooted in the perception that foreign affairs is different from the
domestic order, and that the Constitution should thus be interpreted differently
and more flexibly in the foreign policy arena. The three commonly articulated
types of practical considerations for why constitutional restrictions ought not
apply abroad are all premised on a basic distinction between the domestic and
international arena. First, the Court has perceived practical difficulties in
applying U.S. constitutional rules in territories governed by the United States
that have different cultural, political, and legal traditions.74 Second, as Justice
Field articulated in In re Ross, international jurisdictional principles are
generally based on territory or citizenship, and normally one country cannot
exercise its jurisdiction in the territory of another. 7 5 However, Field's logic was
flawed; because the United States cannot normally exercise lawful jurisdiction
in another country, it does not follow that the Constitution ought not apply as a
limitation on the conduct of U.S. officials when they do act-lawfully or notin a foreign land.7 6 The real concern of Justice Field in In re Ross, and other
Justices articulating the same perspective is with constricting the flexibility of
U.S. officials to act abroad by imposing constitutional rules in situations where
the other nation has different rules that accord government officials greater
discretion.77
The third, and undoubtedly most important, pragmatic reason articulated
for not applying constitutional rules to U.S. conduct abroad is that to do so
would interfere with U.S. foreign policy interests. Harlan's explanation in Reid
for his opposition to the plurality's decision that a trial by jury is required
whenever the government indicts a civilian dependent of a soldier overseas is
of this genre:
Our far-flung foreign military establishments are a new phenomenon in our
national life, and I think it would be unfortunate were we unnecessarily to
foreclose, as my four brothers would do, our future consideration of the broad
questions involved in maintaining the effectiveness of these national outposts,
78
in the light of continuing experience with these problems.

So too, Justice Rehnquist's rationale for not constraining searches by U.S.
officials abroad sought to avoid restraints on U.S. policymakers when dealing
with other nations.79 Indeed, a crucial practical difficulty with applying the
Constitution fully articulated by Justices in the Insular Cases was the United

74.
75.

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 756-58.
In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 453 (1891).

76.

See NEUMAN, supra note 10, at 86-87; see also Cleveland, supra note 18, at 237.

77. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. at 464 ("When, therefore, the representatives or officers of our
government are permitted to exercise authority of any kind in another country, it must be on such
conditions as the two countries may agree, the laws of neither one being obligatory upon the other.").
78. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957).
79. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990); see supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
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States's perceived needs as a rising world power to acquire territory through
war or treaty without all of the restraints imposed by the Constitution.80
Justice Kennedy's reliance in Verdugo-Urquidez on United States v.

Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. for the proposition that the Court must interpret
constitutional protections in light of the "undoubted power of the United States
to take actions to assert its legitimate power and authority abroad" also suggests
that he views the foreign arena as qualitatively different than the domestic
order. Since Curtiss-Wright did not involve any rights aliens might have
abroad, Kennedy must be relying on the Curtiss-Wright decision for its
controversial conclusion that constitutional limitations must be interpreted
differently when the government acts abroad than at home.8 2 The assertion that
the government must be accorded more discretion when it acts internationally
is uncontroversial. But to take the further step of claiming that the Constitution
should be subjected to an entirely different mode of analysis in which
pragmatic considerations are determinative of when constitutional rights apply
abroad is suspect, and Curtiss-Wright has been correctly criticized for its
drastic separation of the international and domestic orders.83
The Court did have alternative approaches to address its foreign policy
concerns. For example, the Boumediene Court clearly did not want to suggest
that a prisoner captured on the battlefield could seek habeas review, 84 and even
progressive commentators who generally support aliens' rights recoil at the
notion that the Court could assert its habeas jurisdiction to review the treatment
of foreign nationals in an active war zone. Yet, even if enemy soldiers were
80. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 279, 286 (1901).
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In Boumediene, Justice
81.
Kennedy again cited to Curtiss-Wright, this time to acknowledge that the political branches must be
accorded appropriate discretion in conducting the war on terrorism. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,
796-97 (2008).
82. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936). Justice Sutherland also
controversially argued in Curtiss-Wright that the government had authority to act in foreign policy that
stemmed not from the Constitution, but from national powers accorded to the sovereign under
international law. Id. at 319. While Kennedy therefore could have been suggesting that such powers
were outside the scope of the Constitution and might trump whatever constitutional restraints exist, such
an argument would directly conflict with his starting proposition contained in the plurality opinion in
Reid-that the government may act only as the Constitution authorizes, both at home and abroad. Reid,
354 U.S. at 6. It is therefore doubtful that Kennedy was using Curtiss-Wright for that more extreme
position.
83. See Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 392-93 (7th Cir. 1998), vacated in part on other
grounds, 165 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1999) (writing that Curtiss-Wright's historical discussion was "quite
possibly incorrect[]," even "'shockingly inaccurate,"' and determining that the historical opinion was
dicta and not binding (quoting Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation: An
HistoricalReassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (1973))); David Gray Adler, The Steel Seizure Case and
Inherent PresidentialPower, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 155, 190 (2002) (criticizing the Curtiss-Wright
decision); Lofgren, supra, at 29-32 (1973) ("Sutherland adduced no evidence, other than practice, that
restrictions imposed by the Constitution on delegation of legislative power do not apply equally to
delegation involving both domestic and foreign affairs. His evidence, other than practice, leads to
precisely the opposite conclusion."); Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L.
REv. 259, 323 (2009) ("Sutherland's extra-constitutional historical narrative, which is inconsistent with
the premise that the Constitution is one of delegated powers, has been shown to be more creative than
descriptive.").
84. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770-71.
85. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, The Abiding Significance of Law in ForeignRelations, 2004
SUP. CT. REV. Ill, 151 ("It cannot be expected that the Court would insert constitutional standards for
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able as a practical matter to assert habeas jurisdiction after being captured on
the battlefront, a proposition that seems dubious, the Court could adopt rules to
preclude any such petitioner from either succeeding in a habeas proceeding or
from interfering with military efficiency or operations. For example, the Court
could have held that only prolonged detention provides an individual with a
habeas claim abroad, or that where the government accords the prisoner his
Geneva Convention rights, no more is required. That the courthouse door might
be open to aliens abroad does not mean that the Court could not fashion rules
based on both principle and practical concerns that would render it impossible
for a battlefield detainee to succeed on a habeas petition.86
Indeed, the same day it decided Boumediene, the Court's decision in
another habeas case illustrated the possibilities for an alternative analysis as to
the rights of aliens detained abroad. In Munafv. Geren, a unanimous Court held
that American citizens imprisoned in Iraq by the U.S. military operating
pursuant to a U.N. mandate had a right to seek a writ of habeas corpus in U.S.
courts. The Court rejected the government's argument that the writ was
inapplicable because the U.S. military was operating as part of a multinational
force. No Justice questioned whether habeas should be available to citizens
being detained even in a foreign country in the midst of warfare. Nor did the
functional test make any appearance in Munaf Nonetheless, the Court's
conclusion that the courthouse door was open to Munaf ultimately did him no
good, because the Court expressed prudential concerns about interfering with a
sovereign's prerogative to apply its criminal law to persons alleged to have
committed crimes within its borders, and also "about unwarranted judicial
intrusion into the Executive's ability to conduct military operations abroad."89
These concerns did not lead the Court to hold that American citizens held
abroad in certain circumstances had no right to seek habeas corpus, but rather
that federal courts should not exercise their habeas jurisdiction to enjoin the
military from transferring citizens detained in another sovereign's territory to
that sovereign government for criminal prosecution. 90 Prudential concerns thus
entered the picture in Munaf not to determine whether habeas jurisdiction was
available, but rather to determine whether the writ should issue. It is unclear
why prudential concerns should play such a different role when aliens rather
than citizens are involved, except possibly that there are more potential cases
involving aliens.
The Court also could have adopted an intermediate position based on
principle and not pragmatics, by holding that habeas applies to any prisoners
detained in foreign territory at a site where the United States exercises effective
treatment of foreign nations into the disorder of an active war zone overseas.").
86. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 70, at 360 (arguing that one possible doctrine is that
constitutional rights apply abroad, but that "they may apply in different ways, with different precise
outcomes or applications, to non-citizens encountering U.S. authority outside the country").
87. Munafv. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
88. Id.at 685-88.
89. Id. at 700; see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 750 (citing Munaf for the proposition that
"prudential concerns ... affect the appropriate exercise of habeas jurisdiction").
90. Munaf 553 U.S. at 700.
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control. Such a conclusion would be consistent with the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission and was suggested in Boumediene by the Court when it asserted
that the "objective degree of control" exercised by the United States in a
foreign place is important to determining whether habeas applies.91 An
effective control test would also remove battlefield captures from the habeas
equation, since presumably the Court would find that the military did not have
effective control over a prisoner in the chaos of battle, but only after
transferring the prisoner to some secure detention facility over which the
United States maintained control.92 Indeed, the British House of Lords adopted
that position in holding that provisions of the European Convention on Human
Rights applied to a detainee held in a British military prison in Iraq.93
D.

Boumediene's Quest for Flexibility: The Functional Test's
Similarity to the Concerns Underlying the Political Question
Doctrine

Despite the arguments for the adoption of a more principled, normative
approach to determine in what circumstances constitutional rights should apply
to governmental actions against aliens abroad, and despite the criticism of the
functional test as "inherently subjective,"94 the functional test allows the Court
to avoid being rigidly constrained by principle and to maintain flexibility, 9 5
which appealed to Justice Kennedy. 9 6 The normative underpinnings of the
91. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754, 763-64. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
for example, has stated that the obligations of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights apply
wherever a state exercises effective control over an individual, irrespective of whether the state is acting
within its own territory. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
109/99, OEA/Ser.L./VII.106, doc. 6 rev. 37 (1999), available at http://www.cidh.oas.orglannualrep/
99eng/Merits/UnitedStates 10.951.htm. The European Court of Human Rights has applied the European
Convention on Human Rights where a state exercises effective control over territory or an individual.
Ocalan v. Turkey, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 238, 93 (2003); Bankovid v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R.
333, $ 71; see also Cleveland, supranote 18, at 269; Cole, supra note 7, at 58-59.
92. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 753, 771.
93. Al-Skeini v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 26, [67], [2008] 1 A.C. 153 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
94. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 843 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. One could question whether a more principled application of constitutional rights to
nonresident aliens could lead to the dilution of the substantive rights in the foreign context that might
have the effect of diluting the protections afforded citizens domestically. NEUMAN, supra note 10, at
111; see Lobel, supra note 27, at 878. The possibilities for dilution of rights once they are applied in
novel and more difficult circumstances are real. For example, the D. C. Circuit in one case assumed that
the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from obtaining coerced confessions abroad, but then
nonetheless found very dubious governmental conduct that appeared coercive to be within constitutional
parameters. Id. (discussing United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953, 967-70 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). But an
answer to this concern is that courts ought to exercise care in determining and stating what specific and
unique practical concerns with imposing a right to new situations require a different enforcement or
application of a right abroad than that required domestically, and not simply to abandon the limitations
the Constitution imposes on government conduct abroad.
96. Another objection to the adoption of either an effective control or prolonged detention test
might be that either could be seen as more directly conflicting with Eisentrager.Indeed, Justice Black's
dissent in Eisentragerargued for an effective control rule. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 798
(1950) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Martin, supra note 70, at 360 (contending that the constitutional
habeas right should apply to detainees at "long-term detention facilities under the control of U.S.
officers"). The Court's functional, pragmatic test allowed it to distinguish and not overrule Eisentrager.
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functional test could thus be seen as similar to those underlying the
controversial and confusing political question doctrine. As Harvard Professor
Louis Jaffe once noted, many issues described by the courts as political are
problems, "for which we do not choose, or have not been able as yet to
establish, strongly guiding rules. We may believe that the job is better done
without rules, or that even though there are applicable rules, these rules should
be only among the numerous relevant considerations."97
While the Boumediene Court decisively rejected the government's
political question arguments, which would have accorded the Executive
unlimited power to determine whether detainees could seek habeas corpus, its
pragmatic test provides an escape mechanism-in some respects similar to that
provided by the political question doctrine-for courts to hold that habeas does
not apply in some yet to be determined detention setting in the future. That the
political question doctrine is often invoked in the context of foreign policy98
further suggests the analogy to Boumediene. As Justice Brennan stated in Baker
v. Carr, even foreign policy matters do not warrant a broad rule of judicial
abstention.99 Rather, a functional analysis must be undertaken on a case-bycase basis. 0 0 The Court's adoption of a case-by-case, pragmatic, functional test
in Boumediene may thus be based on a recognition that the Court sometimes
ought to use pragmatic considerations to avoid addressing or even trumping
constitutional principles.' 0 To the Court, the application of the Constitution
abroad may present one such circumstance. 10 2
The premises and principles of the political question doctrine, however,
are often questioned and are difficult to apply, a slender reed of dubious
legitimacy to support the Boumediene functional test. 0 3 Indeed, the political
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 843 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the "functional" test usefully evades the
precedential landmine of Eisentrager).Nonetheless, an alternative approach would not have required
overruling Eisentrager, since Jackson's Eisentrager opinion is ambiguous and could also be
distinguished on the grounds that despite his broad statement that alien enemies abroad had no right to
seek a writ of habeas corpus, the opinion actually reached the merits of the claim and held that
petitioner's rights had not been violated. See Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 780-81, 790.
97. Louis L. Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV.
1265, 1303 (1961); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 186-87 (1962).

98. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 322 (2d Cir. 2009) (claiming
that foreign policy is one of the "two most highly litigated areas of the political question doctrine").
99. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962).
100. Id.
101.

RICHARD

A.

POSNER,

BREAKING

THE

DEADLOCK:

THE

2000

ELECTION,

THE

CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS 168-73 (2001) (arguing that in various cases, including Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000), the Court used pragmatic considerations to trump constitutional principle).
102. In a somewhat related context, the Court held that an alien's substantial fear of foreign
criminal prosecution was beyond the scope of the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause. United
States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 697-98 (1998). Souter's opinion for the Court relied in part on practical
concerns that, for example, domestic law enforcement would suffer serious consequences if fear of
foreign prosecution were recognized as sufficient to invoke the privilege. Id. at 698. Justices Breyer and
Ginsburg dissented, arguing that whether the Bill of Rights was intended to have any effect on the
conduct of foreign proceedings, it undeniably "prescribes a rule of conduct generally to be followed by
our Nation's officialdom," id at 701 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), and that the Court was allowing
"practical concerns" to "stand in the way of constitutional principle," id. at 716-20 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
103. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Is There a PoliticalQuestion Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 61112(1976).
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question doctrine has rarely been invoked by the Supreme Court, even in the
area of foreign affairs, undoubtedly because of criticisms similar to those
invoked against the functional test.10 Moreover, as already discussed, the
pragmatically driven functional test is at odds with the strong normative
statements of fundamental principles and values invoked by the Boumediene
Court to justify its decision.
The disconnect between the pragmatic inquiries set forth in the functional
test and the fundamental norms that underlie the Boumediene opinion requires
integrating the two disparate strands of the opinion. That project must begin
with the recognition that pragmatic considerations such as the location or
permanent status of a particular military base ought not be dispositive where
certain fundamental rights or principles are involved. For example, the
Constitution ought not permit United States officials to summarily execute or
brutally torture a detainee, irrespective of where that detainee is being held.
A review of the cases that Justice Kennedy relied upon to formulate his
functional test illustrates that those cases support not only the proposition that
pragmatic considerations play a role in determining whether the Constitution
applies abroad, but also indicate that a court must consider whether the
constitutional principle involved is fundamental to liberty. Moreover, the cases
suggest that determining which principles are so fundamental as to apply
wherever the government acts should be made not simply by reference to
American values and culture, but also by what the international community
considers fundamental. It is to those cases that this Article now turns.
III.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE
SUPREME COURT'S EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISPRUDENCE

The Court's richly detailed and careful consideration of the history and
function of habeas review in our separation of powers framework contrasts
sharply with its somewhat cursory analysis of the important cases addressing
questions of the extraterritorial application of constitutional rights from which
it derives the functional test. os Upon review of these cases, it becomes
apparent that the Supreme Court decisions on which Kennedy relied did not
rest merely on practical concerns, but also turned on an evaluation of whether
the constitutional principle involved was fundamental-that is, whether the
government, by denying a person that constitutional right, was acting in a
manner that violated basic notions of fairness or essential aspects of liberty
recognized by any civilized society. Those decisions support the proposition
that essential aspects of liberty in this context must be informed by the norms
that the international community considers fundamental.
The extraterritorial cases are consistent with, and in some respects based

104. Important cases involving United States foreign policy have been decided on the merits by
the Supreme Court in the last sixty years. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984); Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
105. Neuman, supra note 10, at 270 (terming the Court's discussion, in historiographical terms,
a "flattened description of the extraterritorial application of the U.S. Constitution").
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upon, the substantive due process jurisprudence the Court applied in the first
half of the twentieth century. That jurisprudence read the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause to incorporate certain rights against state
conduct where no "civilized system could be imagined that would not accord
the particular protection"' 0 6 where the rights were "of the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty," or where "a fair and enlightened system of justice
would be impossible without them."' 07 That natural law, due process approach
thus explicitly defined fundamental rights by reference to rights universally
recognized by civilized nations.' 08
The Court's incorporation approach changed in the 1960s to an inquiry
into whether a particular right or procedure was "necessary to an AngloAmerican regime of ordered liberty," leading to a divergence between the
rights applicable as against the states and those restraining the federal
government's action abroad.109 Nonetheless, Boumediene and all of the
decisions on which Kennedy relies are consistent with or based on the older
due process jurisprudence for determining the applicability of constitutional
norms to U.S. actions abroad. Thus, those extraterritorial decisions are most
appropriately read to require that the extraterritorial application of a right to be
based on a determination that the right not only reflects American procedures
or values, but also, 0as the Ninth Circuit put it, is "fundamental in this
internationalsense."" 1

A.

The Insular Cases' Recognition of the Distinction Between
Fundamentaland Nonfundamental ConstitutionalPrinciples

The Insular Cases most clearly reflect the older, fundamental rights
jurisprudence. While these cases distinguished between territories acquired by
the United States that were to be incorporated into the United States and those
"unincorporated territories" in which the Constitution would not apply fully,
the Court also distinguished between those principles that were fundamental
and those that were not. The former category of prohibitions would apply
wherever the United States exercised authority. As Justice Brown's opinion in
Downes v. Bidwell, the most important of the Insular Cases, put it, there "is a
clear distinction between such prohibitions as go to the very root of the power
of Congress to act at all, irrespective of time or place, and such as are operative
only 'throughout the United States,' or among the several states."" ' For
106. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968) (explaining the traditional due
process incorporation test).
107. Palkov. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
108. Id.; see also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110-11 (1908) (noting that jurisdiction
and notice are the "two fundamental conditions [of due process] which seem to be universally prescribed
in all systems of law established by civilized countries").
109. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 150 n.14.
110. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1992).
ill. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 277 (1901). In so arguing, Brown appears to have
picked up on an argument made by Abbot Lawrence Lowell, who would later become president of
Harvard, that "[i]t may well be that some provisions have a universal bearing because they are in form
restrictions upon the power of Congress rather than reservations of rights." Abbot Lawrence Lowell, The
Status of Our New Possessions-A Third View, 13 HARv. L. REv. 155, 176 (1899); see also NEUMAN,
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Brown, while the Constitution did not apply to unincorporated territories,
Congress was nevertheless bound by certain fundamental or natural rights,
which apply "by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution" rather than
by any "express and direct application of its provisions."I12
Justice White's concurrence in Downes, joined by Justices Sharis and
McKenna and subsequently adopted by a majority of the Court in Dorr v.
United States" 3 and Balzac v. Porto Rico,"l 4 also distinguished between
fundamental rights and those that merely "regulate a granted power."" 5 For
Justice White, while the full panoply of constitutional rights and provisions
only applied to fully incorporated territories and not those territories that
Congress chose not to incorporate, he recognized, as did Justice Brown, that the
colonized populations had to be afforded some constitutional protections.
For White, those protections stemmed from two sources. First, while
White accorded Congress the "widest latitude of discretion" in exercising its
power to create local governments in the territories, there may be "inherent,
although unexpressed, principles which are the basis of all free government
which cannot be with impunity transcended," a formulation which accords with
the Fourteenth Amendment due process inquiry of the era. That the law of
nations or the practice of other societies would be relevant to such an inquiry
was implicit in White's formulation.
Second, Justice White not only relied upon "inherent, unexpressed,"
fundamental principles to restrain government power over the territories, but
also, unlike Justice Brown, recognized that there were some prohibitions in the
Constitution that would be directly applicable because they were not
mere regulations as to the form and manner in which a conceded power may be
exercised, but . . . are an absolute denial of all authority under any
circumstances or conditions to do particular acts. In the nature of things,
limitations of this character cannot be under any circumstances transcended,
7
because of the complete absence of power.'

In elaborating what were "absolute withdrawals of power,"" 8 White
quoted Justice Field in Chicago Rock Island Railway v. McGlinn for the

proposition that any law supporting an established religion, abridging freedom
of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishment would automatically
be void as violative of the Constitution."' 9 For that proposition, Field in turn

supra note 10, at 85 (arguing that "Lowell's distinction between applicable and inapplicable provisions,
based on verbal form rather than substance, had no future").
112. Downes, 182 U.S. at 364 (quoting Church of Jesus Christ of L.D.S. v. United States, 136
U.S. 1, 10 (1890)); see also id. at 282 (suggesting application of "inherent and fundamental principles
for the protection of the individual, even though there be no express authority in the Constitution to do
so" (quoting Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 109 (1900))).
113. 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
114. 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922) ("[T]he Dort Case shows that the opinion of Mr. Justice White
of the majority in Downer v. Bidwell, has become the settled law of the court.").
I15. Downer, 182 U.S. at 295 (White, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 290-91.
117. Id. at 294.
118. Id at 298.
119. Id. at 298 (quoting 114 U.S. 542, 546 (1885)).
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had relied on Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in American Insurance Co. v.
Canter, which invoked "the usage of the world," and also invoked Halleck's
influential digest of international law.' 20 As Part IV illustrates, White's
articulation of "absolute withdrawals of power" is conceptually similar to
current international law's conception of nonderogable, jus cogens norms-as
is his and Justice Brown's notion of inherent fundamental norms.
The later Insular Cases involving the right to trial by jury also relied on
the distinction between fundamental and nonfundamental rights. Thus, in a
series of cases involving the right to a trial by jury in Hawaii, the Philippines,
and Puerto Rico, the Court held that that right and the right to presentment by
grand jury were inapplicable because they "are not fundamental in their nature,
but concern merely a method of procedure which sixty years of practice had
shown to be suited to the conditions of the islands."l 21 The Court repeated
Justice White's formulation that inherent principles that are the basis of all free
government constitutionally limited U.S. actions in the territories.122 The Court
explicitly distinguished the guarantees of "certain fundamental personal rights
declared in the Constitution, as for instance that no person could be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process," which had been applicable in the
Philippines and Puerto Rico from the beginning of U.S. occupation, and which
presumably was required irrespective of any practical difficulties that might
arise in the application or enforcement of these rights.
B.

Substantive Due Process Concepts in the Court'sPost-World War II
ExtraterritorialJurisprudence

Justices Harlan's and Frankfurter's concurrences in Reid, which Justice
Kennedy relied on significantly in his concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez and
his majority opinion in Boumediene, are also premised on natural law,
substantive due process notions similar to those that underlay the Court's
decisions in Downes and the Insular Cases.123 While Harlan rejected a rigid and
abstract rule that Congress must act subject to all the limitations of the
Constitution no matter how "impractical or anomalous" such a limitation would
be in a particular practical context, he also relied heavily on the fundamental
nature of the right to a jury trial in capital cases.124 For Harlan, capital cases
"stand on quite a different footing than other offenses," because "[i]n such
cases the law is especially sensitive to demands for that procedural fairness
which inheres in a civilian trial."l 2 5 Citing Powell v. Alabama, wherein the
Court held that a state must accord a defendant a right to counsel in capital
120. Id. at 298 (citing 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 511 (1828)).
121. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 144-45 (1904) (emphasis added) (quoting Hawaii v.
Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 218 (1902)).
122. Id. at 147.
123. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 53 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that the
Court has consistently enunciated the "fundamental right" test for issues dealing with constitutional
restrictions on the power of Congress to make rules governing unincorporated territories); id. at 75
(Harlan, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 77 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
125. Id.
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cases, Harlan argued that the process that is "due" in capital cases is different
from what is required where the offender faces a fine or prison sentence; the
distinction is "that between life and death." 2 6 For Harlan that was "precisely
the kind of distinction which plays a large role in the process of weighing the
competing considerations" in determining whether constitutional safeguards
apply to government action abroad. While he did also point out that the number
of capital cases were so few as to present no insurmountable problems in
according defendants in such cases a jury trial, the thrust of his discussion of
capital cases focuses on the nature of the defendant's interest, not on potential
practical obstacles to providing a jury trial.
Harlan and Frankfurter's focus on the fundamental nature of the capital
defendant's interest in Reid became even more pronounced in Kinsella v.
United States ex rel. Singleton, where the Court extended the Reid holding to
non-capital offenses.12 7 In dissent, Harlan and Frankfurter argued that the Court
"passe[d] over too lightly the awesome finality of a capital case," a factor
which they argued is critical to a determination of whether Congress has the
power to provide for non-jury trials in non-capital cases.128 For those two
dissenters, the Court should stay its hand in dealing with considerations and
problems "engendered by present disturbed world conditions," and refuse to
balance factors which they believed that the Court was ill equipped to assess,
"except under the clearest sort of constitutional compulsion." 1 2 9 Capital cases
presented just that sort of compulsion, and in those cases, Harlan would require
not a rational and appropriate basis justifying the exercise of congressional
power, but rather, "a much more persuasive," or compelling, showing that
congressional power was necessary. 13 0 Thus, the principle that emerges from
Harlan's and Frankfurter's opinions in Reid and Kinsella is not that pragmatic
considerations should generally govern, but rather that reasonable, practical
considerations could justify a determination that a particular right is
inapplicable overseas, except where fundamental interests of the individualwhich in Reid amounted to life or death-were at stake.
The Eisentragerdecision is not inconsistent with the Insular Cases and
Justices Harlan and Frankfurter's due process jurisprudence, because that Court
was not confronted with a claim that the military tribunal violated fundamental
notions of due process; as Justice Kennedy pointed out in Boumediene, the
Eisentrager petitioners had clearly been accorded a "rigorous, adversarial
process to test the legality of their detention."1'3 Indeed, while the Eisentrager
Court asserted that the petitioners had no right to habeas corpus, nor were
entitled to the full protection of the Fifth Amendment, it ultimately addressed
the petitioners' Fifth Amendment claims that the military commission that tried

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. (citing 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
Id. at 255 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Id. at 258.
Id. at 256.
Bournediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 767 (2008).
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them was without jurisdiction.132 While Justice Jackson did lean heavily on
practical difficulties in affording habeas hearings to enemy aliens detained
overseas, he also noted that the Eisentragerprisoners had been "fully informed
of particulars," of the charges against them, and had not pointed to any
"prejudicial disparity . . . between the Commission that tried [them] and the
procedures it used and the protections afforded an American soldier of the same
rank," thus suggesting that their trial had comported with basic due process
principles.133 Had the petitioners claimed to have been German civilians, totally
unconnected to the German war effort who had received either no due process
or a process that did not comport with fundamental notions of fairness and
amounted to a "kangaroo trial,"l 34 Justice Jackson's position might well have
been different.135
So too, the Court's holding in Verdugo-Urquidez is consistent with the
Insular Cases' principle that fundamental rights follow the flag. Both Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion and Justice Kennedy's concurrence cited
Downes, with Justice Kennedy noting that the "wholly dissimilar traditions and
institutions" with respect to a requirement of a warrant in Mexico supported the
conclusion that the Warrant Clause did not apply to searches of aliens in that
country.'3 6 That the warrant requirement was not universally accepted, and in
particular not applicable in Mexico, was critical to Kennedy's opinion. While
Justice Kennedy relied on the idea that the conditions of that case made
adherence to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement "impracticable and
anomalous," his conclusion is consistent with finding that the warrant
requirement-while fundamental in current Fourteenth Amendment
incorporation doctrine-is not a fundamental right in the sense used by the
Court in Downes and the other Insular Cases. Indeed, Kennedy discussed
Harlan's "due process" test articulated in Reid and recognized that "due
process" did apply, but held that nothing approaching a violation of due process

132. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785-88 (1950).
133. Id. at 786, 790.
134. At oral argument in the Bagram appeal, Judge Sentelle claimed that it would have made no
difference in Eisentragerhad the petitioners there been subjected to a "kangaroo trial." Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 34. Sentelle's statement is inconsistent with Part IV of Jackson's
opinion. See Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 786, 790.
135. The records from the Eisentrager trials illustrate that "there had been a rigorous,
adversarial process to test the legality of [petitioners'] detention." Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 767.
Moreover, the reference in Jackson's opinion to the practical difficulty of according rights during a
military occupation to "irreconcilable enemy elements, guerilla fighters and 'werewolves' that
Kennedy cites in Boumediene refers to the difficulty of granting all constitutional rights to such
elements. See id. at 770; Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 784-85 (stating that petitioners' construction would
require enemy aliens to be accorded freedom of speech, a right to bear arms, security against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and a right to a jury trial). Indeed, Jackson cited Downes v. Bidwell
for the proposition that "such extraterritorial application of organic law" could not have been intended,
see Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784, and as has already been discussed, Downes held that not all
constitutional rights were required to be extended to unincorporated territories, but only those that were
fundamental.
136. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1990) (citing Downes for the
proposition that only fundamental rights are guaranteed to inhabitants of unincorporated territories).
Justice Kennedy did note that the claim that the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to aliens in
foreign nations is a weaker claim. Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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had occurred.' 3 7 Had the warrant requirement been universally recognized, and
considered a nonderogable right, Kennedy's analysis, and possibly his holding,
would have changed.
Finally, the Boumediene Court, while articulating a version of the
practicable and anomalous test, clearly recognized the fundamental nature of
the petitioners' interest. The Court determined that habeas relief was
fundamental in the American scheme of justice to protect against executive
detention. The Court emphasized throughout its opinion the lengthy, prolonged
confinement of the detainees with minimal procedural safeguards, thus
underscoring the fundamental liberty interests involved in the detainees'
Indeed, as the Court has noted elsewhere, the international
claims.
community recognizes a violation of basic human rights norms where "as a
matter of state policy, it practices, encourages or condones . . . prolonged

arbitrary detention." 39 The Boumediene plaintiffs' claims fit comfortably
within the fundamental rights jurisprudence of Downes and the second Justice
Harlan in Reid and Kinsella, for no modem system of justice in any free
country-either military or civilian-can be imagined in which people who
claim to be civilians are locked up for many years without being accorded
minimal due process.
C.

Differing FundamentalRights Tests for Domestic and International
Incorporationof the Bill ofRights

The Ninth Circuit adopted the reading of the Insular Cases urged here in
Wabol v. Villacrusis, where the court held that the only constitutional
guarantees deemed fundamental for purposes of limiting U.S. government
actions abroad in unincorporated territories are those that are "fundamental" in
an "international sense."' 40 There, the court had to distinguish between the
incorporation doctrine that emerged in the 1960s, which viewed fundamental
rights incorporated vis-A-vis the states as those reflecting American values, and
the incorporation of fundamental norms for the governance of unincorporated
territories abroad, which required a wider international consensus.
In Wabol, the plaintiffs claimed that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibited the United States from imposing race-based restrictions on the
acquisition of permanent and long-term interests in land in the Northern
Mariana Islands, which under the Insular Cases was treated as an
unincorporated territory of the United States in which only "fundamental"
137. Id. at 278. Perhaps Kennedy discussed due process because the Verdugo-Urquidez trial
was to take place here, but in the context in which he raised due process, he seems to be discussing due
process in the broader sense that Harlan and Frankfurter had in Reid v. Covert.
138. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771, 785, 794-95, 797-97. Similarly, Justice Souter's
concurrence (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer) emphasized a "fact insufficiently appreciated by
the dissents is the length of the disputed imprisonment, some of the prisoners represented here today
having been locked up for six years." Id. at 799 (Souter, J., concurring); see also id. at 800-01 ("[I]t is
enough to repeat that some of these prisoners have spent six years behind bars.").
139. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 737 (2004) (emphasis added) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987)).

140. 958 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1992).
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constitutional rights apply.141 In determining what rights were fundamental, the
court relied on its 1984 holding in Commonwealth ofNorthern MarianaIslands

v. Atalig that the right to a jury trial did not apply in the Islands despite the
Supreme Court's holding in Duncan v. Louisianal4 2 that the right was
fundamental for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation with regard
to the states.14 3 In Atalig, the court had distinguished the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporation test-which focuses on whether a right is necessary
to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty-and the Insular Cases testwhich recognized as fundamental 'those . . . limitations in favor of personal
rights,' which are 'the basis of all free government."'"" The "international
sense," that the Ninth Circuit referred to in Wabol was thus a recognition that a
"basic and integral freedom" was one that reflected "the shared beliefs of
diverse cultures," in other words one that the entire international community
recognized. 14 5 Only by viewing fundamental rights in this broader way would
the court preserve "Congress' ability to accommodate the unique social and
cultural conditions and values of the particular territory." 46
The Ninth Circuit then utilized Justice Harlan's Reid v. Covert functional
test, which determined that imposing the Equal Protection Clause would be
"both impractical and anomalous in this setting."l 47 But the court's invocation
of the impractical and anomalous test functioned to support its conclusion that
the cultural and social diversity reflected in the Mariana Islanders' differing
attitudes toward property did not violate any fundamental rule of international
law and indeed furthered international norms.148 The court noted:
It would truly be anomalous to construe the equal protection clause to force the
United States to break its pledge to preserve and protect NMI culture and
property. The Bill of Rights was not intended to interfere with the performance
of our international obligations. Nor was it intended to operate as a genocide
pact for diverse native cultures. . . . Its bold purpose was to protect minority
rights, not to enforce homogeneity. Where land is so scarce, so precious, and so
vulnerable to economic predation, it is understandable that the islanders' vision
does not precisely coincide with mainland attitudes toward property and our
commitment to the ideal of equal opportunity to its acquisition. We cannot say
that this particular aspect of equality is fundamental in the international

141. See id. at 1460 n.19.
142. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
143. Commonwealth ofNorthern MarianaIslands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1984).

144. Id. at 690 (quoting Dorrv. UnitedStates, 195 U.S. 138 (1904)).
145. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1460.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1462.
148. Various lower courts have held, on a variety of rationales, that the Insular Cases'
distinction between protected fundamental rights and non-protected rights survives the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporation cases. See, e.g., Commonwealth of the N. Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d
682, 688-90 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 898-99 (3d Cir. 1981) (relying on
the Insular Cases for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment grand jury requirement does not apply to
the Virgin Islands); King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("[The Insular Cases] have
never been overruled; specifically, they have not been overruled by the Duncan and Baldwin cases,
which dealt with the right to trial by jury in states rather than unincorporated territories."); Gov't of the
Canal Zone v. Scott, 502 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1974) (relying on the Insular Cases for the proposition
that the Fifth Amendment grand jury requirement does not apply to the Canal Zone).
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sense. 149
Moreover, as the court made clear, the fundamental right to a fair trial protected
by the Due Process Clauses was a fundamental right in the international
sense. 1o Presumably, therefore, had the Pacific Islanders had a local custom
that dispensed with any trial or proceeding to determine guilt or innocence,
such a process would have been unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court's reluctance in Boumediene and other modern cases
to reiterate the Insular Cases' fundamental rights jurisprudence explicitly is
understandable-that due process jurisprudence is controversial, and its natural
law foundations are disfavored. It was effectively discarded with regard to the
application of the Bill of Rights to the states, and its contours are murky and ill
defined. While the Court omitted any reference to international law as a guide
to determine which norms were fundamental, perhaps because it was concerned
about the perceived legitimacy of doing so, or because it feared substituting the
entire panoply of international human rights norms for the Bill of Rights, the
current Fourteenth Amendment incorporation jurisprudence was also
undoubtedly unacceptable because it would deprive the Court of the flexibility
to pick and choose which constitutional provisions to enforce and the contexts
in which they would be applicable. Nonetheless, the Court's repeated
reiteration in Boumediene that the detainees had been held for a prolonged
period of time with few procedural safeguards suggests that the egregiousness
of their long-term detention, and not merely the unique characteristics of
Guantanamo, was an important and perhaps decisive factor motivating the
Court.
Thus, in an important sense, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Boumediene is
similar to his Lawrence v. Texas opinion for the Court: both are premised on
fundamental rights jurisprudence that spoke clearly throughout the opinion but
were never officially articulated nor elaborated as part of a "test."151 Professor
Tribe's observation about the Lawrence decision could equally apply to
Boumediene, which, like the title to Tribe's article on Lawrence, involved "The
'Fundamental Right' That Dare Not Speak Its Name."l 5 2
While the Court's reluctance to ground any "test" on fundamental rights
notions is understandable, fundamental norms nonetheless pervade the
Boumediene opinion. Indeed, as demonstrated above, the extraterritorial cases
are either explicitly based on a fundamental rights jurisprudence, or more
recently are implicitly consistent with the jurisprudence's basic premise that
there is certain conduct, so inimical to the idea of free government, that U.S.
officials should be constitutionally barred from engaging in it wherever and
against whomever they act. A test that requires courts to ignore the
fundamental nature of the interest or right asserted in the name of practical
considerations is even murkier and more subjective than one based on

149.
150.
151.
152.

Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462.
Id. at 1460.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Tribe, supra note 16.
Tribe, supra note 16.
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fundamental rights, and focuses courts' attention on only one piece of the total
picture.
The question presented by the line of cases from the Insular Cases to
Boumediene is how to decide whether a constitutional limitation is fundamental
and whether it should be enforced extraterritorially. The substantive due
process test that underlies the Insular Cases and Justices Harlan's and
Frankfurter's opinions in Reid focuses the inquiry on what principles are
inherent in any civilized society, whatever their particular legal and cultural
traditions. That test implies an international law inquiry into what norms cut
across national boundaries and can be said to be truly universal and not
particular to the United States. From that perspective, the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement and the Sixth Amendment provision for trial by jury are
not fundamental, but the proscriptions against torture and summary execution
contained in the Fifth and Eighth Amendments are.
While for purposes of domestic incorporation of the Bill of Rights with
respect to the states, the substantive due process inquiry departed from the
older cases in the 1960s to focus on rights fundamental to the Anglo-American
tradition, 53 the older jurisprudence ought still apply to the incorporation of
constitutional norms to U.S. actions outside U.S. territory. Thus the recognition
that the domestic and international arenas are somewhat different and present
different constitutional challenges should not require the abandonment of
principle for pragmatics, but rather an internationalist inquiry that
simultaneously addresses the cultural, legal, and practical differences and
problems presented by applying constitutional norms to U.S. actions abroad.
Such an inquiry flows from the extraterritorial cases relied on by Boumediene.
Fortunately, modem international law has evolved since World War II to
permit courts to make a distinction between fundamental and ordinary norms
recognized by the international community.154 While the lines of that
distinction are sometimes murky and ambiguous, the basic outlines are fairly
clear. The international community has recognized that certain norms are so
fundamental that it is never impractical to apply and enforce them. Consistent
with the jurisprudence of the aforementioned cases, courts should look to that
body of international law to aid the determination of whether a particular
constitutional provision applies to U.S. government action against aliens
abroad.

IV.

APPLYING THE CONSTITUTION ABROAD: AN INTERNATIONAL
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS APPROACH

Modern international law recognizes that there are certain basic norms of
civilized society-referred to as jus cogens or nonderogable norms-that are so
fundamental as to be binding on every nation in all situations, even in times of
war or national emergency. The prohibitions on torture, genocide, slavery,
extrajudicial execution, and prolonged arbitrary detention without judicial
153. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
154. See infra Section IV.B.

334

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 36: 307

review fit this description. From both a theoretical and functional perspective, a
minimalist, yet principled, normative basis for determining which constitutional
norms ought to be applicable when the U.S. government acts abroad could rely
on those fundamental nonderogable principles of international law which
cannot be violated under any circumstance.s This Part explains why such an
international fundamental rights approach to the extraterritorial application of
the Constitution makes sense both practically and doctrinally. It discusses the
modem international law development of concepts of jus cogens and
nonderogable norms and the historical role that the Framers and early leaders of
our nation believed international law played in determining the constitutional
authority of the political branches. This Part also reviews the Supreme Court's
use of international law in interpreting the Constitution to illustrate that such an
approach, while not relied on by the Boumediene Court, would not be
inconsistent with the Court's prior jurisprudence.
A.

The Utility and Doctrinal Compatibility of an International
FundamentalNorms Approach

An approach to the extraterritorial application of the Constitution abroad
that asked whether the constitutional principle at issue reflects a fundamental,
nonderogable norm of international law would both preserve governmental
flexibility in dealing with different cultures, societies, and legal systems, as
well as the myriad problems that afflict foreign policy, yet also recognize that
there are certain types of conduct that are so contrary to the fundamental norms
of civilized society that the Constitution must prohibit the government from
engaging in them whenever, wherever, and against whomever it acts. The cases
the Boumediene Court relied on-Verdugo-Urquidez, Eisentrager, the Insular

Cases, and the Harlan and Frankfurter opinions in Reid-are all premised on
the proposition that when the government acts abroad, there may be
circumstances when it acts in the context of a different legal regime that
permits a practice that the Constitution would prohibit were the actions to occur
here. In Verdugo-Urquidez, Mexican law did not require a search warrant;' 5 6 in
Eisentrager,military law and the international law of war permitted trial of war
crimes committed by enemy combatants by military tribunal;' 57 in the Insular
Cases, the law of newly acquired territories did not provide for jury trials. 158
Unlike the rights at issue in those cases, there are some rights, such as the

155. I suggested such an approach, although I did not elaborate on it, in Jules Lobel,
Extraordinary Rendition and the Constitution: The Case of Maher Arar, 28 REV. LITIG. 479, 497-99
(2008). Professor Neuman also has suggested that jus cogens might provide a reference point to decide
which constitutional rights apply abroad, but has not elaborated on or analyzed the idea. Gerald L.
Neuman, Understanding Global Due Process, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 395-96 (2009). For a related
argument that fundamental international law norms ought to be constitutionally binding on U.S. actors,
see Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and
InternationalLaw, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071 (1985).
156. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262-63 (1990).
157. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 786 (1950).
158. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 269 (1901) (discussing the law of various
territories regarding jury trials).
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right to be free of torture, genocide, or slavery, that are treated as fundamental
and never derogable by the international community as a whole. While nations
obviously do engage in torture, genocide, and slavery, no country asserts the
legal authority to do so, and laws of other nations prohibit such practices.,s9
The cultural and legal diversity rationale partially underlying the Boumediene
functional test is thus inapplicable to such nonderogable universal norms.
Moreover, the international community, including the U.S. government,
has not merely accepted these rights as fundamental, but has agreed that it is
never "practicable" to engage in such conduct as, for example, torture,
summary execution, or genocide, irrespective of whatever "realistic,"
"practical" foreign policy arguments are made to support such actions. To use
fundamental international law norms to inform the Constitution's reach would
thus both provide a limiting normative principle and also meet the practical
concerns that the Court focused on in Boumediene.
A fundamental international rights approach would also be consistent
with the substantive due process, extraterritorial constitutional jurisprudence
discussed in Part III and relied on by Boumediene, as well as the Boumediene
opinion itself, which, while silent about international law, relied heavily on
fundamental rights principles. As demonstrated in Section C of this Part, the
approach urged here also comports with the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution, who generally accepted that certain undefined "natural" or
necessary principles of the law of nations limited the government's foreign
affairs powers set forth in the Constitution.
This international fundamental rights approach is also suggested by a
number of relatively recent decisions by lower federal courts and the U.S.
Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit Wabol decision that constitutional rights
applicable in unincorporated territories must be fundamental in the
"international sense"'16 0 supports the approach urged here, as does a D.C.
Circuit opinion recognizing in dicta that certain basic, nonderogable norms of
international law may restrain our government in a constitutional manner. 16' So
too, the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Balsys suggests that the
nonderogable nature of an international norm could play a role in determining
the applicability of the corresponding constitutional principle in a context
involving foreign governments.1 62 And the line of lower court cases affirmed
by the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain-which recognized that

federal courts have jurisdiction to hold foreign state actors liable for actions
that violate international norms governing the universal prohibition of
particularly heinous conduct-suggests that such norms at least provide a
reference point for articulating which constitutional principles are applicable to
U.S. officials when they act abroad.' 63

159. See Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
160. Wabol v. Villacmsis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1992).
161. Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 941-42 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
162. 524 U.S. 666, 695 n.16 (1998).
163. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); see also Fildrtiga,630 F.2d. 876.
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An international fundamental rights jurisprudence would not require the
Court to apply all of the Bill of Rights provisions to U.S. government actions
abroad, nor even all provisions of the Bill of Rights that can be said to represent
customary international law, but rather, as the Court in Boumediene put it, "to
use its power sparingly and where it would be most needed."164 This approach
would require an integration of the fundamental rights strands of the opinion
into the Court's functional test. However, the Court left room for an elaboration
of its functional test when it concluded that "at least three factors are relevant
in determining the reach of the Suspension Clause."165
To be sure, utilizing international law to help determine which
constitutional norms apply abroad would represent a major innovation in a
decision that made virtually no mention of international law. So too, according
fundamental rights jurisprudence the important influence suggested here would
be in tension with the functional balancing factors test. My point is not that a
fundamental international rights jurisprudence flows from or is required by
Boumediene, but rather simply that Boumediene is not inconsistent with such a
role for nonderogable international rights. This is so in large part because the
practical, functional concerns that underlay the Court's reluctance to apply
habeas or other constitutional rights in all circumstances where the United
States acts abroad are addressed by the international community's recognition
that certain particularly heinous or odious acts are never justified by such
practical considerations.
Nor would the use of international law to inform the reach of
constitutional norms to U.S. action against aliens abroad be subject to the same
objections that have been raised against the Court's use of international or
foreign law as an aid in determining the content of Americans' constitutional
rights. 166 The question this approach raises is not whether "American law
should conform to the laws of the rest of the world," as Justice Scalia has put
it, or even more modestly-as the Court has, in fact, used foreign and
international law' 6 -whether the views of other nations are helpful in
interpreting the content of our constitutional principles. Rather, the Court
would only be using nonderogable fundamental international norms to help
determine which U.S. constitutional principles are so fundamental as never to
164. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759 (2008).
165. Id. at 727 (emphasis added).
166. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 325 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's use of foreign views
are dispositive'
because under the Eighth Amendment, "'American conceptions of decency ...
(quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989))).
167. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. See, e.g., id. at 575-78 (majority opinion) (stating that international law is relevant to the
determination of society's evolving standards of decency under the Eighth Amendment); see also id. at
604-05 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Over the course of nearly half a century, the Court has consistently
referred to foreign and international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving standards of
decency."); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) ("[W]ithin the world community, the
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly
disapproved."); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576 (invoking the decision of the European Court of Human
Rights in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981), in support of recognition of a
right of homosexual adults to engage in consensual intimate conduct).
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be impracticable to apply abroad. Under this proposal, the Court would not
actually apply international definitions of torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading
treatment, genocide, prolonged arbitrary detention, or slavery, but would
instead apply constitutional definitions of those terms, to the extent that the
constitutional proscription was not broader than that provided by international
law. The Senate, Congress, and several lower courts have used a similar
technique to narrow the application of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights prohibition on cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment to
only prohibit conduct which would violate the U.S. Constitution
There are a number of objections that could be made to the nonderogable
fundamental international norms approach urged here. First, the development
of the concept of nonderogable, peremptory norms is still relatively new and
uncertain in international law, and the norms that qualify for such status are not
well defined. Nonetheless, certain basic norms clearly are nonderogable, and
others, such as prolonged arbitrary detention without judicial review, while not
clearly defined as nonderogable, have also been viewed by authoritative
sources as such. 70
Another objection is that using such a minimal standard as international
nonderogable norms would entail the "dilution or elimination of rights that
cannot be described as fundamental in any international sense." 7 ' I have
sympathy with that objection, and indeed elsewhere I have argued that all of the
Constitution's provisions ought to apply wherever and whenever the
government acts.' 72
Nonetheless, it is now clear that the Supreme Court is unwilling to treat
the Constitution abroad as it does at home, and will choose some constitutional
rights to apply in certain situations and not others. The question then becomes
whether it is preferable for the Court to make those decisions based on a purely
practical or functional basis, or to establish a normative basis for determining
that certain principles can never be violated, irrespective of where the
government acts. In a judicial climate where the D.C. Circuit has in the past
denied that the Constitution's proscription against torture is applicable
abroad, 73 and both the Second and D.C. Circuits have taken the view that a

169. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Reservations,
Understandings, Declarations, and Proviso, 138 CONG. REc. 8070-71, § 1(3) (1992); Xunca v. Gramajo,
856 F. Supp. 162, 187 (D. Mass. 1995) (ruling that "any act by the defendant which is proscribed by the
Constitution and by a cognizable principle of international law" as cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment is sufficiently defined to be actionable under the Alien Tort Statute).
170. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

§ 702

(1987); see also Marjorie

M. Whiteman, Jus Cogens in InternationalLaw, with a ProjectedList, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 609,
625-26 (1977) (listing twenty acts the author believes are or should be outlawed under jus cogens).
171. Burnett, supranote 10, at 1013; see, e.g., Atamirzayeva v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 378,
387 (2007) (dismissing for lack of standing an alien's complaint seeking compensation for the alleged
taking of her property in Uzbekistan by the United States government), aJ'd,524 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2008). The Fifth Amendment Compensation Clause does not represent a nonderogable international
norm.
172. See Lobel, supra note 27.
173. See Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 602-04 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev d on othergrounds sub
nom. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002); In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479
F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007).
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Bivens action is not available for claims of torture involving U.S. foreign
policy,174 setting forth a clear standard proclaiming that torture anywhere is
beyond the government's constitutional authority and that the judiciary should
and must hold officials who authorize torture abroad accountable would be an
important advance in constitutional doctrine.
In sum, the question of whether a particular constitutional norm is
applicable in a specific context abroad cannot be decided exclusively or
primarily by means of the functional or practical considerations set forth in the
Boumediene test, but rather must rely substantially on the importance of the
alien's asserted right or interest. Since the context in which the government is
acting is international and will often involve different legal systems, the Court
should refer to those international norms widely recognized as fundamental by
the international community to aid in determining which constitutional
principles should be applicable abroad.
This approach essentially reintegrates Justices Harlan and Frankfurter's
substantive due process/fundamental rights approach that underlies the Insular
Cases and the Reid concurrences into Boumediene's functional test, but with a
frame of reference provided by contemporary international law. It also draws
on the modern substantive due process and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
that legitimately considers the views of the international community as to the
constitutional principle at issue. 175 As in those cases, the question is not
whether a particular international law principle is binding on the United
States.176 Rather the inquiry is whether the views of the international
community support recognizing that a constitutional norm is so fundamental
that it should be applicable to U.S. government actions against aliens abroad.
The approach urged here is both more muscular yet more modest than the
Court's use of international law in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. It is
more muscular because the Court's recognition that a particular constitutional
principle is widely recognized in the international community as a fundamental
norm would be an independent factor supporting its application
extraterritorially, and not merely, as in the Court's domestic jurisprudence, a
factor supporting or confirming the Court's independent conclusion that a
particular practice is impermissible. Yet the approach is also more modest in
that it does not use international law to support the Court's recognition of a new
constitutional proscription, but rather simply the application of a wellestablished proscription in an international context.
Finally, an important objection to the approach urged here is that the
Boumediene Court declined to employ international law in its functional test,
despite numerous amici urging it to do so. The Court's reluctance to refer to
international law in this controversial area is likely to continue in future cases.
Nonetheless, as outlined in Parts H and III, a clear tension exists between the
174. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574-75 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc); Rasul v. Myers, 563
F.3d 527, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
175. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033-34 (2010) (citing Eighth Amendment
cases); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003).
176. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
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Court's practical, functional test and the fundamental rights jurisprudence that
undergirds its opinion. The Court inevitably will have to revisit this tension in
the future, and will be forced to work out and explore the relationship between
the fundamental nature of the alien's right and the practicalities of enforcing
that right. The international law approach suggested here would be helpful to
the Court in addressing that tension, and nothing in Boumediene precludes the
Court from recognizing international law's utility in future decisions.
B.

The Modern Development
InternationalLaw Norms

of Fundamental, Nonderogable

Contemporary international law has revitalized a distinction between
ordinary and fundamental norms that was familiar to the Framers of the
Constitution. Eighteenth-century international law scholars and American
political leaders distinguished the "immutable" natural, necessary law of
nations that was not premised on reciprocal observance, and could not be
dispensed with, from the voluntary, positivistic part of international law from
which nations could depart.' 77 While the triumph of positivism and its political
corollary of absolute sovereignty in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
undermined the distinction between necessary and voluntary principles of law,
the carnage wrought by the two world wars, as well as the imposition of
criminal liability on the Nazi leaders at Nuremberg after World War II, led to a
revival of concepts of fundamental international law norms that restrict
sovereign power wherever and whenever the sovereign acts.
Modem international law increasingly draws hierarchical distinctions
among customary norms.'7 8 The International Court of Justice has referred to
"fundamental" or "peremptory" principles of customary law as a category
distinct from ordinary custom or treaty norms.'79 Such fundamental norms of
177. Vattel separated the voluntary law of nations from the "immutable" law of nations, of
which he said that states "can neither make any changes in it by their conventions, dispense with it in
their own conduct, nor reciprocally release each other from the observance of it." EMER DE VATTEL,
THE LAW OF NATIONS, at Iviii (Joseph Chitty ed. & trans., Philadelphia, T. and J.W. Johnson, Law
Booksellers, 5th American ed. 1839); see also MYRES S. McDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNGCHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 341 (1980) (stating that jus cogens
distinguishes between positive law and the "necessary law of nations," which cannot be changed); 2 C.
WOLFF, Jus GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM 10 (Joseph Drake trans., Clarendon
Press 1934) (arguing that the law of nations comes from the law of nature and is "necessary and
immutable").
178. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 107-08 (Lori F. Damrosch et al.
eds., 4th ed. 2001); ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2006) (analyzing the impact of jus cogens norms on international law and security); Juan Antonio
Carrillo Salcedo, Reflections on the Hierarchy ofNorns in InternationalLaw, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 583,
586-88 (1997); Marrti Koskenniemi, Hierarchy in InternationalLaw: A Sketch, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 566
(1997) (contemplating strategies to deconstruct hierarchies in international law); Prosper Weil, Towards
Relative Normativity in InternationalLaw, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 421-30 (1983) (arguing that jus
cogens and international criminal liability suggest new developments in structure of international
norms). But see Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 291
(2006) (recognizing that it may be appropriate today to recognize fundamental norms, but arguing that
the concept is still disputed and not grounded in state practice).
179. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 2006
I.C.J. 6, 1 64 (Feb. 3); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1979 I.C.J.
7, IN1J
38-40 (Dec. 15); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),

340

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 36: 307

international law, unlike ordinary norms, are generally nonderogable and
restrict not only a government's legal rights, but also its legal power to act. 80
An international norm is fundamental if, in addition to the consensus required
for ordinary rules of international law,'8 1 there is widespread agreement among
states that the norm is peremptory and cannot be disregarded for any reason.182
The revival of fundamental law notions in positive international law1 8 3 is
reflected in a number of different modem concepts and doctrines: the
incorporation of the concept of jus cogens into the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties' 84 and customary international law,185 the development of
individual criminal liability for a handful of international crimes, 1 the growth
of the principle of universal jurisdiction,
and the adoption of provisions in
multilateral treaties permitting no derogation even in time of national
emergency.s88 While each of these international law concepts is somewhat
different and addresses particular problems, they all reflect a growing
international law theme that certain norms are of a higher nature and limit the
normal discretion accorded to governments.
For example, the concept of jus cogens embodies fundamental, or
peremptory, norms of international law and is incorporated into the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 53 of that Treaty provides:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law ... from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international
89
law having the same character.'

Jus cogens represents "the body of those general rules of law whose nonobservance may affect the very essence of the legal system to which they
belong to such an extent that the subjects of law may not, under pain of

1986 I.C.J. 14, 11 100, 188 (June 27).
180. See, e.g., Siderman v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718 (9th Cir. 1992) ("International law
does not recognize an act that violatesjus cogens as a sovereign act."). Ordinary norms of international
law, by contrast, can be analogized to contract obligations; states can violate those rules subject only to
liability for damages or other sanctions. Of course, no law, international or constitutional, restricts the
military or physical power of a government. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 168 (1972) (distinguishing between the power and the right to breach a treaty).
181. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, $ 74-77 (Feb. 20); Asylum
Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276-78 (Nov. 20); CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND
REALITY INPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 154, 156-57 (P. E. Corbett trans., rev. ed. 1968).
182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 331 cmt. e (1987).
183. See U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, Ist Sess., 56th mtg., at 327,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11 (May 7, 1968) (statement of Sir Humphrey Waldock) (noting that "the
International Law Commission had based its approach to the question of jus cogens on positive law
much more than on natural law").
184. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 n.6 (1987) (noting that the
concept ofjus cogens is "now widely accepted . . . as a principle of customary law (albeit one of higher
status)").
186. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; 1
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 171 (1946).

187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987).
188. See infra notes 204-210 and accompanying text.
189. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supranote 184, art. 53.
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absolute nullity, depart from them."l 90 While the norms that are considered jus
cogens norms remain ill defined, and the Restatement suggests that the concept
should therefore be applied cautiously,' 9 1 the Restatement nonetheless
concludes that jus cogens norms include the prohibitions against genocide,
murder (often referred to as summary execution), causing a person's
disappearance, torture, slavery, slave trading, and prolonged arbitrary
detention.192
Concepts similar to jus cogens were widely accepted during the
eighteenth century under natural law theory, and they began to reappear in the
early 1900s.19 3 In 1919, professor and future Supreme Court Justice Sutherland
noted that a treaty violating "fundamental principles of the law of nations" is
not "within the legitimate power of any treaty-making agency." 1 94 The concept
achieved prominence in Sir Hersch Lauterpacht's First Report on the Law of
Treaties in 1953.195 The notion of jus cogens received broad support from
scholars,' 96 the International Law Commission,197 and many governments,198
and is now incorporated as part of a widely ratified treaty that the U.S.
government agrees generally represents customary international law.199
190. Erik Suy, The Concept of Jus Cogens in Public InternationalLaw, reprinted in THE
CONCEPT OF Jus COGENS ININTERNATIONAL LAW: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 17, 18 (1967).
191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 331 n.4 (1987); see also Shelton,
supranote 178 (expressing skepticism and caution about the validity and utility of the concept).
192. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987); see also
Whiteman, supra note 170, at 625-26 (listing twenty acts the author believes are or should be outlawed
under jus cogens).
193. Alfred Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 571, 571
(1937). See also sources cited in Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivun and Jus Cogens in International
Law, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 55, 55 n.I (1966) [hereinafter Verdross, Jus Dispositivum].
194. GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND WORLD AFFAIRS 141-42 (1919).
195. H. Lauterpacht, Report on the Law of Treaties, [1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 90, 154,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63.
196. See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 322-23 (1952); LORD MCNAIR,

THE LAW OF TREATIES 213-14 (1961); Grigory I. Tunkin, Jus Cogens in Contemporary International
Law, 1971 U. TOL. L. REv. 107, 108-11 (1971) (summarizing the views of various scholars supporting
concept of jus cogens); Verdross, Jus Dispositivum, supra note 193, at 56-57. However, there were
notable exceptions. See Georg Schwarzenberger, InternationalJus Cogens?, 43 TEX. L. REV. 455
(1965). Some initially reticent scholars have now apparently accepted the concept. See Verdross, Jus
Dispositivum, supra note 193, at 57 (discussing Paul Guggenheim).
197. Summary Records of the 717th Meeting, [1963] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 290, 292, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/156.
198. See Sir Humphrey Waldock, Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 1, 23, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/183 ("[O]nly one Government-the Luxembourg Governmentreally questions the existence today of a concept of rules ofjjus cogens in international law."). After the
formulation at the 1963 session of the International Law Commission of what became Article 50 of the
Draft Articles of the Law of Treaties, fifty-one governments commented directly on the concept of jus
cogens as part of the draft. Of these, forty-three favored the concept, only one unambiguously opposed
it, five indicated a somewhat negative view, and two did not indicate their final position. Egon Schwelb,
Some Aspects of InternationalJus Cogens As Formulatedby the InternationalLaw Commission, 61 AM.
J. INT'L L. 946, 960 (1967).
199. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 184. The U.S. objections to Article
53 concerned who would determine when a rule had reached the status of jus cogens, which was
resolved by a provision referring disputes over jus cogens to the International Court of Justice. See
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 50-51 (Comm. Print 1984).
The United States has yet to ratify the Convention, but recognizes it "as the authoritative guide to
current treaty law and practice." Letter of Dep't of State to President, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 92-1 (1971).
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Similarly, the development of international treaties and tribunals to
criminalize and punish certain international law violations reflects the elevation
of certain norms of international law to a more fundamental status.2 oo A closely
related development involves the concept of universal jurisdiction, which
allows any state to define and to punish certain offenses recognized by the
international community as being of universal concern. 2 01 Certain treaties, such
as the Convention on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, provide that any state may exercise its jurisdiction
whenever a violator is found within its territory irrespective of where the delict
was committed or of the nationality of the parties. 2 02 Universal jurisdiction is
also related to the "essential distinction" recognized by the International Court
of Justice in the Barcelona Traction case
between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a
whole, and those arising vis-i-vis another State in the field of diplomatic

protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view
of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection; they are obligations ergaomnes.203
Finally, human rights treaties now identify certain nonderogable rights

that cannot be violated even in times of national emergency. For example, the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,204 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,2 05 and the American
Convention on Human Rights206 all contain clauses allowing their provisions to
be suspended in certain periods of crisis. None of these treaties, however, allow
any suspension of the right to life, the prohibition of torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment, the freedom from slavery, or the proscription on ex post
facto laws. 2 07 The common status of these four rights as nonderogable in each
of these treaties suggests that the principle that these rights cannot be violated
even during national emergencies is now a rule of customary international
law.208 So too, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions identifies a core
of norms that "are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
The principles of Article 53 are thus "still effective as customary law," but can be applied "only with
caution." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

§ 331

n.4 (1987).

200. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note
186; International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid art. 1,
adoptedNov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter Apartheid Convention].
201.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

§ 404 (1987).

202. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
203. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4,32 (Feb. 5).
204. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15(1),
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
205. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
206. American Convention on Human Rights art. 27(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
[hereinafter American Convention].
207. See American Convention, supra note 206, art. 27; ICCPR, supra note 205, art. 4;
European Convention, supra note 204, art. 15.
208. Joan Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies, 22 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 1, 15 (1981).
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whatsoever" regarding individuals "taking no active part in hostilities,"
including prisoners of war.209 These protections apply to noninternational
armed conflicts, where the more restrictive provisions of the Geneva
Conventions addressing international armed conflicts would not govern.210
C.

The Framers' and Early Leaders' View of International Law as
ProvidingLimits on the PoliticalBranches' ConstitutionalPowers

An extraterritorial jurisprudence that relied on fundamental, nonderogable
jus cogens norms of international law to inform the Constitution's limitations
on the federal government's exercise of its foreign affairs powers abroad would
be consistent with both the Framers' intent and the practice of our early
political leaders. For the twentieth-century development of a hierarchy of
norms distinguishing between certain fundamental, nonderogable norms and
ordinary norms essentially revives, on a more positivistic foundation, the
eighteenth-century distinction between necessary international norms, which
operated as limits on the constitutional foreign affairs powers of government,
and voluntary rules, which could be superseded by the legislature. This Section
discusses the Framers' view that international law provided limits to executive
and legislative powers, and that the Constitution mrust be interpreted
consistently with that law. It also reviews the two most prominent early
controversies involving aliens, which illustrate the role international law played
in the arguments over the scope and limitations of the government's
constitutional authority to act against aliens.
The generation that drafted the Constitution and led the new nation
viewed international law as an important component of fundamental natural
law that provided legal restraints on government power.211 Domestic law and
international law were not viewed as two wholly separate bodies of law, but

209. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316.
210. Id.
211. 1 J.J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW 135-36 (T. Nugent
trans., 7th ed. 1830); WILLIAM JOHN DUANE, THE LAW OF NATIONS INVESTIGATED IN A POPULAR
MANNER: ADDRESSED TO THE FARMERS OF AMERICA (Philadelphia, William Duane 1809); H. GROTIUS,
THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (L. Loomis trans., 1949); S. PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND
NATIONS (C. Oldfather & W. Oldfather trans., 1934); see also Edwin Dickinson, Changing Concepts
and the Doctrine of Incorporation,26 AM. J. INT'L L. 239 (1932) (discussing the relationship of natural
law to international law in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thought); Jesse S. Reeves, The Influence
of the Law of Nature upon InternationalLaw in the United States, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 547 (1909)
(discussing the influence of European natural law scholars on early American conceptions of
international law). Justice Story wrote in 1822:
[E]very doctrine, that may be fairly deduced by correct reasoning from the rights and
duties of nations, and the nature of moral obligation, may theoretically be said to exist in
the law of nations; and unless it be relaxed or waived by the consent of nations, which
may be evidenced by their general practice and customs, it may be enforced by a court of
justice, whenever it arises in judgment.
United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551). But see The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825) (holding that the slave trade, although contrary to the law
of nature, was not prohibited by international law, and remained lawful for those whose governments
had not prohibited it).

344

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 36: 307

rather as interrelated branches of the law of nature.212
The Framers, early government leaders, and international scholars
distinguished between two types of international law. The basic, primary, or
"necessary" international law stemmed from the law of nature and was
"consequently immutable, insomuch that the people or sovereigns cannot
dispense with it, even by common consent, without transgressing their duty,"
while the voluntary laws could be modified by the legislature. 213 For example,
in the important 1784 case of Rutgers v. Waddington, Alexander Hamilton
argued that the New York Trespass Act of 1783 conflicted with the law of
nations and was therefore "void."214 In his opinion for the court, Mayor James
Duane agreed that no legislature could enact a statute in derogation of the
"natural" law of nations-that part of international law arising from the law of
nature.2s Foreigners could rely on the natural law of nations, "which is part of
the law of the land" and according to which "the [case] must be decided." 2 16 By
contrast, Duane thought it possible that the national, although not the state
217
legislature could enact statutes in violation of the "voluntary" law of nations.
Although Mayor Duane formally denied any judicial power to reject legislative
acts, he employed a technique, argued for by Hamilton, of construing the law
"againstthe letter of the Statute to render it agreeable to natural justice."2 18
Supreme Court Justice James Wilson-a key figure at the Constitutional
Convention and Pennsylvania ratifying convention and an important
constitutional theorist of the time 219-also made the same distinction between
212. C. PICCiorro, THE RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND AND OF

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 107 (1915); Harold H. Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of
InternationalLaw in the FederalCourts of the United States, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 284 (1932).
213. BURLAMAQUI, supra note 211, at 138; see also Edmund Randolph, Who Privilegedfrom
Arrest, I Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792) (arguing that the basic natural law obligations of the law of
nations "commence[] and run[] with the existence of a nation, subject to modification on some points of
indifference"); BURLAMAQUI, supra note 211, at 139 ("[M]axims of the law of nations have an equal
authority with those of the law of nature"); VATTEL, supra note 177, at Iviii-lix (arguing for the
immutability of the "application of the law of nature to states" and, in turn, of international law).
214.

1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 378, 382 (J. Goebel ed., 1964).

215. Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in SELECT CASES OF THE
MAYOR'S COURT OF NEW YORK CITY 1674-1784, at 315 (R. Morris ed., 1935) [hereinafter MAYOR'S
COURT].

216. Id.
217. According to Duane:
"The primary law of nations therefore is no other than the law of nature, so far as it is
applicable to them. Whatever, in this behalf, reason dictates is a duty of natural justice,
from the necessary law of nations."
Thus far we could agree with the professor, that no state can by its separate
ordinance, prejudice any part of such a law-nay, that all the states of the world united
could not; because being of moral obligation, it is immutable. But when this doctrine is
applied in general to all customs, which prevail by tacit consent as part of the law of
nations; we do not find that he is warranted by authorities.
Id. (quoting a contemporary treatise on jurisprudence).
218. 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 214, at 357, 415-18.
Duane's opinion stirred up considerable political opposition in New York. See MAYOR'S COURT, supra
note 215, at 312-14; L. ERADES & WESLEY L. GOULD, THE RELATION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND MUNICIPAL LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS AND IN THE UNITED STATES 238-39 (1961).

219. CHARLES PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER 1742-1798, at 280, 341
(1956); see also GARY L. MCDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 52-53 (1982) (arguing that

Wilson was "second only to Madison in his theoretical contributions to the final document").
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the necessary or natural law of nations and the voluntary law of nations. He did
so in questioning congressional power to punish "persons not citizens of the
United States" in a manner that might conflict with the "predominant authority
of the law of nations." 220 Wilson argued that the natural law of nations was
immutable; apart from "the voluntary or positive law of nations .. . no state or
states can, by treaties or municipal laws, alter or abrogate the law of nations
any farther." 221
The Framers viewed the breadth and scope of the foreign policy powers
granted the federal government by the Constitution as being limited by the
natural law of nations. John Jay argued in The Federalist Papers that no
explicit constitutional provision was required to deprive the President and
Senate of the power to enter into a corrupt treaty, because any such treaty was
"null and void by the law of nations." 222 Similarly, writing after the
Constitution was adopted, Hamilton argued that there were only two sources of
limitations on the treaty power-constitutional limitations and "a natural
exception to the power of making treaties, as there is [for] every other
delegated power." 22 3 Thus, the Constitution's distribution of power was already
limited by "natural principles," including the "natural" law of nations.
The clearest expression by the Framers that the powers delegated to the
federal government were limited by certain fundamental or natural principles of
international law came in the Virginia ratification debates. Southern states such
as Virginia feared that the federal government might exercise the treaty power
to give up navigation rights to the Mississippi River, and a substantial portion
of the Virginia ratifying convention focused on the scope of the treaty-making
power. 224 Speaker after speaker addressed the Antifederalist concerns, arguing
that despite the absence of explicit textual limitations, the treaty power was
limited by the law of nations. Madison asserted that "neither the old
Confederation nor the new Constitution involves a right to give up the
navigation of the Mississippi. It is repugnant to the law of nations." 225 George
Nicholas added that the rights to the river were secured by the law of nations,
because a treaty depriving a state of "territorial rights is obviously repugnant to
that law."226 Governor Randolph noted that any relinquishment of the right to
navigate the Mississippi would be contrary to the law of nations and therefore
beyond federal power. 227 Randolph responded to the opponents of the
Constitution who had objected to the absence of any "clause which shall
220.

1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 334 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds.,

2007).
221. Id. at 333.
222. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 438 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
223. Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. XXVI (1796), reprinted in 20 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 3, 7 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974).
224. See ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 205
(1935).
225. See 3 THE DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 345 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott 2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter DEBATES] (remarks of James Madison).
226. Id. at 357 (remarks of George Nicholas); see also id at 502 (arguing that the law of
nations is superior to any act or law of any nation and "mutually binding on all").
227. Id. at 361-62 (remarks of Edmund Randolph).
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preclude Congress from giving away this right" 228 by arguing that "[t]here is a
prohibition naturally resulting from the nature of things, it being contradictory
and repugnant to reason, and the law of nature and nations."229
The role of international law in the interpretation of the scope of federal
power to act against aliens is also evident in the two most important early
controversies involving the rights of aliens. The first dispute involved the Alien
and Seditions Acts. Madison argued against the punishment of aliens who were
not enemies, because the law of nations did not grant the U.S. government the
power to banish or punish alien friends. 2 30
While Madison also argued that the Act "subverts" the "positive
provisions" of the Constitution contained in the Bill of Rights, his primary
231
claim was that Congress had no power to enact the statute. In response to the
Federalist argument that the law of nations authorized the removal of aliens and
that Congress was accorded the constitutional authority to define offenses
against the law of nations, Madison asserted that the law of nations only
authorized the banishment of enemy aliens, but not alien friends. 2 32 Madison
believed that enemy aliens had no right under the Constitution precluding their
removal, because "the act of Congress for the removal of alien enemies, being
conformable to the law of nations, is justified by the Constitution."233 In
contrast, the removal of alien friends was not "within the purview of the law of
nations," and therefore "the act for the removal of alien friends, being
repugnant to the constitutional principles of municipal law, is unjustifiable." 234
More generally, the war powers of the Constitution-the power of Congress to
declare war, to authorize reprisals, to protect each state from invasion-read
consistently with the law of nations, allowed for the removal of enemy aliens,
but did not accord the federal government the power to remove alien friends. 23 5

228. Id. at 362.
229. Id.; see also id at 511 (remarks of Francis Corbin) (arguing that even if Congress yielded
the Mississippi by a common treaty, the law of nations would be violated and "the cession would be
nugatory"). It bears noting that even the Antifederalist arguments often recognized that international law
implicitly limited the federal treaty power, although they argued for additional institutional checks. See
id. at 350 (remarks of William Grayson) (agreeing that the rights to the Mississippi could not be
alienated pursuant to the law of nations).
230. See Madison, supra note 49, at 556-57.
231. Id. at 553-54.
232. Id. at 556-57.
233. Id. at 557 (emphasis added).
234. Id. Madison distinguished between the law of nations and "the general practice of
nations," both of which, he claimed, "distinguish[] between alien friends and alien enemies." Id This
distinction between the law of nations and general practice undoubtedly was premised on the difference
between the natural or necessary law and voluntary practice or customs of nations.
235. Madison's arguments were echoed by John Taylor, in introducing the resolution to the
Virginia House of Delegates. Since "aliens, under the law of nations, were entitled and subjected to the
sanctions of municipal law," and since "the Constitution was a sacred portion of municipal law," and
because the "law of nations was .. . in contemplation whilst defining the judiciary power," aliens could
only be punished or removed in accordance with the judicial procedures established by the Constitution.
Resolutions of Virginia of December 21, 1798, and Debate and Vote Thereon, reprinted in THE
VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799-1800, TOUCHING THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS; TOGETHER WITH THE
VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF DECEMBER 21, 1798, THE DEBATE AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON IN THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA, AND SEVERAL OTHER DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE REPORT

AND RESOLUTIONS 22, 115-16 (Richmond, J.W. Randolph 1850).
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The Federalists argued that aliens had no rights under the Constitution
and that international law did not provide aliens with any vested right. 23 6 The
Federalist response to Madison's report, thought to be written by John Marshall
and General Henry Lee, did not, however, argue that aliens had no
constitutional rights at all, but rather claimed, "[C]ertainly a vested right is to
be taken from no individual without a solemn trial, but the right of remaining in
our country is vested in no alien; he enters and remains by the courtesy of the
sovereign power, and that courtesy may at pleasure be withdrawn." 237 While
the meaning of "vested rights" is unclear, implicit in this argument was the
principle that, had international law provided rights for aliens who resided in a
friendly country, Congress would have been without power to expel them.
International law played a similarly important role in the arguments over
the breadth of the Executive's constitutional power in another important early
controversy involving U.S. actions against aliens. In 1818, while commanding
troops in the Seminole War in Florida, which was then Spanish territory,
General Andrew Jackson utilized a military tribunal to try, convict, and execute
two British subjects, Alexander Arbuthrot and Robert Christy Ambrister, on
charges of inciting and aiding the Creek Indians to war against the United
States.238
The House of Representatives initiated an inquiry into the propriety of
Jackson's actions, which was referred to the Military Committee. 23 9 A divided
Committee determined that it could "find no law of the United States"
authorizing the trial before a military court for offenses such as those alleged
against Arbuthnot and Ambrister.240 The Committee also concluded that the
court-martial proceeding was marred by serious procedural irregularities,
suggesting that some notion of due process applied to the trial.24 1 The minority
report of the Committee, echoing a defense of Jackson by Secretary of State
John Quincy Adams, argued that because the British citizens associated with
savages who violated the laws of war, Jackson had lawful authority under the
laws of nations to execute them. 242
236. See NEUMAN, supra note 10, at 54-55.
237. Address of the Minority in the Virginia Legislature to the People of the State: Containing a
Vindication of the Constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Laws (1799), at 9-10, cited in NEUMAN,
supra note 10, at 55.
238. See LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32458, MILITARY TRIBUNALS:
HISTORICAL PATTERNS AND LESSONS (2004), at 8-11, for a general discussion of this incident.
239. WALTER LOWRIE & MATTHEW ST. CLAIR CLARKE, I AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
MILITARY AFFAIRS 735 (1819); ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER 363 (1976). Congressman Cobb and others thought the issue was a "proper subject of inquiry for
the Committee of Foreign Relations" and moved that the Committee should investigate the matter with
"'instructions to inquire whether in said trials the Constitution and laws of the United States, or the law
of nations, have been violated."' ANNALS, supra note 50, at 370 (emphasis added).
240. ANNALS, supranote 50, at 516.
241. Id. at 517.
242. Id. at 527; see Letter from J.Q. Adams, Sec'y of State, to George W. Erving, Minister
Plenipotentiary to Spain (Nov. 18, 1818), reprinted in 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN
RELATIONS 539, 544 (1834) (citing Vattel for the proposition that a nation engaged in a war with an
"inhuman enemy [sic]" may execute prisoners). See also J. Andrew Kent, A Textual andHistoricalCase
Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 532-33 (2007), for an insightful analysis of this
incident.
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The House debated a resolution to disapprove the trial and execution of
Arbuthnot and Ambrister. Speaker of the House Henry Clay argued that
Jackson's actions were without congressional authority and in derogation of
international law. 243 Clay's opponents, such as Congressman Smyth of
Virginia, claimed that the "Constitution and laws were formed for the people of
the United States" and had no force in Florida. 24 Smyth and others who agreed
with him noted that executive officials "may do beyond the jurisdiction of the
United States whatever the law of nations or treaties authorize the United States
there to do," implying, as the Federalists did in the Alien and Sedition Act
debates, that the Executive's foreign affairs powers were limited by

international law.2 45
Thus, even Jackson and his supporters appeared to agree that if the
executions violated international law, as many of his critics asserted, his orders
would have exceeded his lawful, constitutional authority. Jackson's critics,
such as Clay and other members of Congress, went further and argued that even
where the law of nations lays down a rule, such as the principle that captured
spies can be executed, a military commander must be authorized by statute to
establish a military tribunal to do so or he acts in excess of his constitutional
authority. 246 The House rejected the resolution by wide margins, undoubtedly
due to Jackson's popularity and the animus toward the Indians, referred to as
"savages," and anyone who aided them.247
These early incidents, as well as the Framers' statements, support the
notion that international law was viewed during our founding period as limiting
the political branches' constitutional authority with respect to aliens. While
contemporary political and legal theory often accepts a sharp divide between
the domestic and international law, so that international law can be viewed as a
separate sphere not affecting the Constitution's allocation of power, that was
not true at the Republic's beginning. The use of international law to aid in
243. ANNALS, supranote 50, at 644-45 (statement of Rep. Clay).
244. Id. at 693 (statement of Rep. Smyth).
245. Id. at 679. For other statements to the same effect, see id. at 1042 (statement of Rep.
Baldwin) (stating that constitutional rights were inapplicable because the men were found and executed
outside of the territorial limits of the United States, where our laws and Constitution have no operation,
except when the law of nations applies); and id. at 778 (statement of Rep. Barbour) (stating that the
"question must be settled according to the laws of war"). See generally Kent, supra note 242, at 533-34
(providing incisive analysis of the relevant positions).
246. ANNALS, supra note 50, at 644-46 (statement of Rep. Clay); id. at 751-52 (statement of
Rep. Staus) (arguing that courts-martial derive their authority from statute); id. at 618 (statement of Rep.
Nelson) (same); id. at 627-28 (statement of Rep. Johnson) (arguing that there was no inherent executive
authority).
247. Id. at 1132-36. A little over a month after the House Committee submitted its report, a
select Senate Committee issued a report on Jackson's actions in Florida, which did not address the
legality or constitutionality of the executions. The Committee noted, however, that "humanity shudders
at the idea of a cold-blooded execution of prisoners disarmed and in the power of the conquerors." Id. at
267. Moreover, the principle that Jackson had assumed-that, by joining in warfare against the United
States while Britain was at peace with us, Arbuthnot and Ambrister "became outlaws and pirates liable
to suffer death"-was, according to the Senate Committee, "not recognized in any code of national law.
Nothing can be found in the history of civilized nations which recognized such a principle, except a
decree of the Executive Directory of France, during their short career of folly and madness." Id. The
Senate adjourned on March 3 without acting on the Committee report. LOWRIE & ST. CLAIR CLARKE,
supra note 239, at 739-43.
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determining the limits of the constitutional authority of the Executive and
Congress to act against aliens abroad is thus consistent with the views held by
the Founders and early leaders of the republic.
D.

The Court's Use of InternationalLaw in Interpreting the Extent of
the PoliticalBranches' ForeignAffairs Powers

The Framers' and early leaders' views that the government's foreign
affairs powers should be construed consistently with basic international law
norms has found reflection in Supreme Court jurisprudence.248 For example,
the Court has often recognized the principle articulated by Jay in The Federalist
Papers and by the Federalists in the Virginia ratifying debates that the proper
scope of a treaty should be determined by international law.2 4 9
The Court has also relied upon international law to inform the reach of
the Constitution's war powers clauses.2 5 0 Chief Justice Marshall's majority
opinion in the 1814 case of Brown v. United States held that the scope of the
President's constitutional war powers should be construed consistently with the
law of nations. Marshall argued that "a construction [of the Constitution] ought
not lightly to be admitted which would give to a declaration of war an effect in
this country it does not possess elsewhere." 25 1 Justice Story's dissent disagreed
with Marshall's view of international law, but he too limited the Constitution's
war powers to those "which, by the modern law of nations, are permitted and
approved." 25 2 Moreover, Story noted that the President "has a discretion vested
in him, as to the manner and extent; but he cannot lawfully transcend the rules
of warfare established among civilized nations. He cannot lawfully exercise
powers or authorize proceedings which the civilized world repudiates and
disclaims." 253
In Miller v. United States, involving a challenge to the 1862 Confiscation
Acts authorizing the confiscation of rebel property, the Court relied on
international law to determine that the Acts were a proper exercise of
Congressional war powers. 2 54 In dissent, Justices Field and Clifford also
invoked international law but disagreed with the majority's reading of that law.
They argued that the statutes exceeded Congress' war powers because they
violated customary international law:

248. See Cleveland, supra note 18.
249. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 261 (1796) (Iredell, J.) ("The subject of treaties
... is to be determined by the law of nations."); see also De Gefroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1889)
("It would not be contended that [the treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution
forbids, or a change in the character of the government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any
portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent."); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540,
569 (1840) (Taney, J.) (concluding that the federal treaty power includes the power to enter into an
extradition treaty because issues involving extradition "are a part of the law of nations"); Cleveland,
supra note 18, at 14-16.
250. See Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
251. Id. at 125.
252. Id. at 145 (Story, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 153.
254. 78 U.S. (11 Wall) 268, 305-13 (1870).
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The war powers of the government have no express limitation in the
Constitution, and the only limitation to which their exercise is subject is the law
of nations. . . . And it is in the light of that law that the war powers of the
government must be considered. The power to prosecute war granted by the
Constitution, as is well said by counsel, is a power to prosecute war according
to the law of nations, and not in violation of that law. . . . [T]he law of nations
. . . is no less binding upon Congress than if the limitation were written in the
Constitution. The plain reason of this is, that the rules and limitations
prescribed by that law were in the contemplation of the parties who framed and
the people who adopted the Constitution.2

More recently, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, both Justice O'Connor's plurality
opinion and Justices Souter and Ginsburg's partial concurrence and dissent
relied on international law to inform the scope of the President's power to
detain enemy combatants. The plurality relied on "longstanding law-of-war
principles" both to affirm the Executive's statutory authority to detain an
American citizen captured in Afghanistan and to cabin the breadth of that
authority, at least in the context of that case. 256 Justice Souter's opinion used
international law more assertively, claiming that the President could not rely on
powers granted by the laws of war if he was, at the same time, transgressing the
limits imposed by those laws.257
Lower federal courts have generally relied on the laws of war to
determine the scope of the President's authority to detain individuals in the
conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban,2 5 8 although a D.C. Circuit panel
recently rejected the premise that the war powers granted the President in the
2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) "are limited by the
international laws of war." 259 The panel claimed that "while the international
laws of war are helpful to courts when identifying the general set of war powers
to which the AUMF speaks, their lack of controlling legal force and firm
definition render their use both inapposite and unadvisable when courts seek to
determine the limits of the President's war powers." 260 However, an en banc
majority of the D.C. Circuit, in a concurrence explaining the denial of en banc
review, pointedly declared this discussion unnecessary to the decision,
255. Id at 315-16 (Field, J., dissenting).
256. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516-21 (2004) (defining an enemy combatant for
purposes of this case as someone "part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition
partners" in Afghanistan and who "engaged in an armed conflict against the United States there"
(quoting Brief for Respondents at 3, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696), available
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbls69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/216/Brief Respondents
at
.pdf)).
257. Id. at 551 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
258. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Gherebi v. Obama, 609
F. Supp, 2d 43, 70-71 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that the government has the authority to detain individuals
who were part of or substantially supported Al Qaeda and/or the Taliban, provided that those terms "are
interpreted to encompass only individuals who were members of the enemy organizations' armed forces,
as that term is intended under the laws of war, at the time of their capture" (emphasis added)); Hamlily

v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74, 76 (D.D.C. 2009) (concluding that under the law of war, the
government has the authority to detain individuals who were "part of... Taliban or Al Qaeda forces" or
"associated forces," but not to detain those who merely provided "substantial support" to these groups).
259. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh'g en banc denied, 619 F.3d
1 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
260. Id. at 871-72.
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seemingly depriving it of binding precedential effect.261
U.S. courts have often utilized international law as a one-way ratchet to
accord, affirm, or broaden governmental power to act abroad. However, the
rationales expressed by courts in using international law to affirm government
power should also apply where international law provides limits to the foreign
affairs powers of the government. A modest use of international law consistent
with the Court's prior use of international law would be for courts to use those
nonderogable, jus cogens norms to help determine which constitutional
proscriptions limit the political branches' constitutional authority when they act
against aliens abroad.
E.

The Relevance of Nonderogable Norms of International Law to
Determining Which ConstitutionalRights Apply Extraterritorially

The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have hinted at the role
nonderogable, jus cogens international norms might play in determining the
constitutional limitations on government actions abroad. In United States v.
Balsys, the Supreme Court referred to nonderogable norms in the context of a
decision holding that the privilege against self-incrimination only applied to
domestic and not foreign prosecutions.262 The Balsys Court held that a resident
alien facing a deportation hearing was not entitled to assert a claim of privilege
even where he faced a reasonable fear of foreign prosecution if deported,
distinguishing the federal/state prosecution context in which both the state and
the federal government were bound by the principle against self-incrimination.
In contrast, the Court noted that there was no international law principle against
compelled self-incrimination, and therefore in many situations the witness'
exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination would have no impact on
any proceedings in foreign court.263 Moreover, even where, as in Balsys, the
countries involved were signatories to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and therefore recognized a right against compelled selfincrimination, the Court noted that the significance of that acceptance is
"limited by its provision that the privilege is derogable and accordingly may be
infringed if public emergency necessitates." 264
The Court's opinion in Balsys thus reflects the same practicable and
anomalous concerns expressed by Justice Kennedy in Verdugo-Urquidez: the
incongruence of imposing a constitutional norm on the conduct of U.S. officials
where the foreign state was not so bound.265 Yet the Court suggested that the
situation would be different if a nonderogable norm of international law was
implicated. For in that situation, the foreign context would have been no
different than the domestic one, in which both jurisdictions are bound by the

261. 619 F.3d at 2 (Sentelle, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
262. 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
263. Id. at 695-96.
264. Id. at 695 n.16.
265. That the coerced self-incrimination took place in the United States was of no importance to
the Court, nor was the citizenship of the witness. Id. at 671.
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same nonderogable norm. 26 6
The recognition by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts that
federal courts have jurisdiction to hold foreign state actors liable for actions
taken against their own citizens in violation of a narrow set of international
norms that define universally accepted, particularly heinous conduct also
suggests that such norms might at least provide a reference point for
articulating those constitutional norms which could be applicable to U.S.
officials' treatment of foreigners abroad.267 The Second Circuit's holding in
Fildrtiga v. Peila-Irala that "for purposes of civil liability the torturer has
become-like the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis humani generis,
an enemy of all mankind," suggests that our Constitution should be read to
forbid U.S. officials from torturing anyone, irrespective of the citizenship of the
victim and the place where the torture takes place.268 For it seems anomalous
for United States courts to adjudicate the responsibility of foreign governmental
officials for the torture of aliens abroad, yet accord U.S. officials immunity for
the very same act. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit suggested as much in Committee of
United States Citizens Living in Nicaraguav. Reagan:

Such basic norms of international law as the proscription against murder and
slavery may well have the domestic legal effect that appellants suggest. That is,
they may well restrain our government in the same way that the Constitution
restrains it. If Congress adopted a foreign policy that resulted in the
enslavement of our citizens or of other individuals, that policy might well be
subject to challenge in domestic court under international law. Such a
conclusion was indeed implicit in the landmark decision in Filartigav. PeilaIrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), which upheld jurisdiction over a suit by a
Paraguayan citizen against a Paraguayan police chief for the death by torture of
2 69
the plaintiffs brother.

To be sure, these decisions at most suggest or perhaps foreshadow an
approach to the extraterritorial application of the Constitution that utilizes
fundamental, nonderogable norms of international law. But they do illustrate
some judicial support for such an approach.
V.

THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY CANADIAN AND EUROPEAN
COURTS IN THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
OR HuMAN RIGHTS

The Canadian Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights and
266. The Court held in Balsys that the foreign analogy must be to the era when the privilege
against self-incrimination had not yet been held to be incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause into state proceedings, and therefore when federal prosecutors were not required to
afford the privilege to those who faced a fear of state prosecution. Id. at 695.
267. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Fildrtiga v. Pefla-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980). The norms for which jurisdiction has been recognized under the Alien Tort Statute are
somewhat broader than just jus cogens norms, encompassing all customary international law norms of
sufficiently definite content. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
268. Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 890; see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 761-62 (Breyer, J., concurring)
("[Riecognition of universal jurisdiction in respect to a limited set of norms is consistent with principles
of international comity.").
269. Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 941-42 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
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the House of Lords have each utilized either substantive or jurisdictional
international law to decide the extraterritorial application of basic constitutional
or human rights norms. Of course, none of this jurisprudence is binding on the
Supreme Court. Moreover, these courts have not adopted the specific
fundamental norms approach urged in this Article. Nonetheless, the fact that
other, closely allied nations with developed legal systems have relied on
international law to inform their jurisprudence on the extraterritorial application
of their basic rights supports our courts' use of international law to decide such
questions. An analysis of these foreign judicial decisions yields important
lessons that ought to inform the post-Boumediene efforts of U.S. courts to
determine in what circumstances constitutional norms apply extraterritorially.
A.

The Canadian Supreme Court's Use of International Law in
Determining the Extraterritorial Application of the Canadian
Charter

The first Canadian case to suggest that international human rights norms
should play a role in the extraterritorial application of the Canadian Charter of
270
Rights and Duties was R. v. Hape, decided in 2007. In Hape, the Supreme
Court of Canada addressed the issue of whether the Charter's guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure applied to a warrantless search of a Canadian
businessman conducted by Canadian police officers outside of Canadian
territory so as to exclude the seized evidence from being introduced at the
businessman's trial in Canada. 27 1
The majority in Hape echoed Justice Kennedy's position in VerdugoUrquidez (although that case involved a Canadian citizen, not an alien), holding
that it is "evident from a practical standpoint that the Charter cannot apply to
searches and seizures in other countries."272 The Court relied heavily on
international law to hold that the Charter did not apply, reasoning that the
extraterritorial application of the Charter to a search by Canadian police abroad
without the foreign state's consent would be inconsistent with limitations on a
state's enforcement jurisdiction,273 would constitute an interference with the
other state's sovereignty, 27 4 and would violate principles of comity. 2 75 The
majority recognized, however, that international jurisdictional law did not
really provide an answer to the question that the case presented, since applying
the Charter's limitations would not require a Canadian police officer to act
extraterritorially in violation of the laws of the foreign nation, but merely
would require them not to act extraterritorially when such actions would violate
the Charter's proscription. 276 That solution, however, was unacceptable to the
Court for practical reasons because it would limit Canada's ability to
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 (Can.).
Id.
Id. paras. 88-89 (LeBel, J.).
Id. paras. 57-59.
Id. para. 84.
Id. paras. 50-52.
Id. para. 97.
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investigate and prosecute transnational crime. 277
While holding that the Charter did not apply to a search and seizure
abroad (of either a Canadian citizen or an alien), the Court recognized that the
deference required by the principle of comity and sovereignty "ends where
clear violations of international law and fundamental human rights begin."2 78
That fundamental human rights exception was applied by the Court a year later
in Canada(Justice)v. Khadr.2 79

In Khadr, a Canadian citizen held at Guantanamo Bay sought an order
requiring the government to disclose documents relating to interviews
conducted by Canadian officials at Guantanamo. The government argued that
the Charter did not apply outside of Canada. A unanimous Court held that
where Canadian officials act abroad "in conformity with Canada's international
obligations, the Charter has no application." 280 However, "[I]f Canada was
participating in a process that was violative of Canada's binding obligations
under international law, the Charter applies to the extent of that
participation." 2 8 1 The Court made clear that the Charter bound Canadian
officials acting abroad to the extent those officials were involved in
international law violations,282 and that notions of "fundamental justice are
informed by Canada's international human rights obligations." 283 In 2010, the
Canadian Supreme Court reiterated its previous holding and issued declaratory
relief that Canada had violated the Charter, but reversed a lower court order
requiring Canada to seek Khadr's repatriation to Canada because of the
incompleteness of the evidentiary record, "the limitations of the Court's
institutional competence," and the need to respect the foreign policy powers of
the Executive. 284
The Khadr Court, however, relied heavily on the fact that the U.S.
Supreme Court had held that the detainees had been illegally denied access to
habeas corpus and that the military commission procedures under which Khadr
277. Id. para. 98.
278. Id. para. 52; see also id para. 51 (stating that "the need to uphold international law may
trump the principle of comity"); id para. 100 (leaving open the possibility that participation by
Canadian officers in activities in another country that would violate Canada's international human rights
obligations might justify a remedy under the Charter). Some commentators have severely criticized the
Court's Hape decision as reflecting a step backward in Canadian law, which had in the past applied the
Charter to Canadian governmental action against Canadian citizens abroad, irrespective of any
international law violations. See, e.g., Chimhne I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders,36 YALE J. INT'L L.
55, 86-87 (2011). I agree with Keitner's critique of Hape's territorial analysis of the Charter's
application abroad and also recognize, as Justice Binnie pointed out in his concurring opinion in Hape,
that the content of international law proscriptions would be weaker than the corresponding Charter
requirements. R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, para. 186, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, para. 186 (Binnie, J.,
concurring). Nonetheless, the recognition that the Charter applies where clear international norms are
violated, if vigorously enforced, would provide significant extraterritorial protection to aliens. Whether
the Hope exception will be seriously enforced is, however, subject to doubt. See infra notes 286-289 and
accompanying text.
279. 2008 SCC 28, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125 (Can.).
280. Id. para. 19.
281. Id.
282. Id para. 26.
283. Id para. 29.
284. Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, para. 46, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44, para. 46
(Can.).
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was to be prosecuted violated the Geneva Conventions.285 In addition, Khadr
was a Canadian citizen, although that factor did not enter into the Court's
rationale.
However, a subsequent case decided by the Canadian Federal Court of
Appeal has cast doubt on the breadth and scope of the Khadr rulings. In
Amnesty International Canada v. Canada, a unanimous court of appeal held

that the Charter did not apply during the armed conflict in Afghanistan to the
detention of non-Canadians by the Canadian Forces or to their transfer to
Afghan authorities even if such transfer exposed them to a substantial risk of
torture.286 The court distinguished Khadr on the grounds that (1) in Khadr no
deference to U.S. law was required because of the holdings of the U.S.
Supreme Court with respect to Guantanamo Bay and (2) Khadr was a Canadian
citizen, whereas the Afghan detainees were foreigners with no attachment
whatsoever to Canada.28 7
The Canadian Supreme Court refused to hear Amnesty International's
appeal, thus contributing to the lack of clarity as to the meaning and reach of its
Khadr opinion.288 Undoubtedly, the Hape exception and the Khadr ruling will
require clarification in future Supreme Court decisions. 2 89 Nonetheless, at least
in certain circumstances, the Canadian Court has used substantive intcrnational
human rights norms to determine whether Canada's constitutional rights will
apply to governmental actions abroad. While the theory underlying the Hape
and Khadr decisions is somewhat different from that proposed here, those
opinions lend support to the substantive use of international law to determine
the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution.
B.

The Effective Control Jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights and the British Courts

The European Court of Human Rights and the British House of Lords
have utilized a jurisdictional approach to determine the extraterritorial
application of the European Convention on Human Rights. This approach
focuses on whether government officials exercise "effective control" either
over the territory or the individual alien upon whom they are acting, a test that
has also been applied internationally by other human rights bodies.290 As noted
in Part II, the "effective control" test has several important advantages and, if
adopted by U.S. courts, could lead to a considerable clarification and
improvement of Boumediene's functional approach. 291 First, the test has gained
significant traction internationally. Second, application of the effective control

285. Id paras. 21-23.
286. Amnesty Int'l Can. v. Canada (Chief of the Def. Staff), 2008 FCA 401, [2009] 4 F.C.R.
149 (Can.).
287. Id paras. 9-14.
288. Amnesty Int'l Can. v. Canada, [2009] 1 F.C.R. I (Can.).
289. Keitner, supranote 278, at 91 (articulating the confusion the Khadr opinion has resulted in
and suggesting that the Canadian Supreme Court will need to revisit the Hape ruling).
290. See cases and authorities cited supranote 91; see also Keitner, supra note 278, at 96-106.
291. See Note, supra note 18.
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test would seem to require that United States troops and officials apply the full
panoply of constitutional protections at securely controlled United States
military bases around the world, or where U.S. officials are acting in territory
subject to de facto control by the United States. Moreover, an effective control
test is consistent with Boumediene's functional test's emphasis on practical
questions such as control.
Nonetheless, despite these advantages, the effective control doctrine has
two serious drawbacks that the international law/fundamental norm test
proposed here seeks to overcome. The first is that the question of what
constitutes "effective control" is very controversial and has been subject to
confusing and contradictory interpretations. For example, while the European
Court has held that Turkey exercised effective control over Northern Cyprus
sufficient for the application of the European Convention of Human Rights to
claimed violations committed in that territory,292 the Court, in its Bankovid v.
Belgium decision concerning NATO's bombing of the Serbian Radio and
Television station in Belgrade during the 1999 airstrikes against Yugoslavia,
took a narrow view of effective control.293 The Court in Bankovid stated that
the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Convention was "exceptional," 294
recognized only effective control over territory and not the exercise of state
authority and control over persons, and held that NATO's control of the
airspace over Yugoslavia did not give rise to effective control necessary for the
Convention to apply. The decision has been widely criticized. 295
Subsequent decisions of the European Court have taken a more expansive
view of "effective control." For example, in Ocalan v. Turkey the Court held
that the Convention's protections could be applied to Turkey's arrest and
forcible extradition of a Turkish national from Kenya,296 and in Issa v. Turkey,
the European Court of Human Rights applied the effective control standard to
Turkish acts in Iraq where the victims were under State agents' "authority and
control," even though Turkey clearly did not control the territory of northern
Iraq.297
The House of Lords' decision in Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for

Defence recognized that there was a clear conflict between cases such as Issa
and Bankovid, and chose to adopt Bankovid's narrower reading of the
Convention's extraterritorial applicability. 298 The Law Lords accepted the
government's concession that the Convention applied to actions taken at a
British military base in Basra,299 but held that it did not apply to soldiers'

292. Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513,156 (1997).
293. Bankovid v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333.
294. Id.161.
295. MICHAL GONDEK, THE REACH OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A GLOBALISING WORLD:
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 169 (2009); Cleveland, supra note 18,

at 265-66.
296. Ocalan v. Turkey, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 238 (2003).
297. Issa v. Turkey, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 567, 71 (2005).
298. AI-Skeini v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 26, [67], [75], [2008] I A.C. 153, [67],
[75] (Lord Rodger) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); id. [131] (Lord Carswell).
299. Id. [61] (Lord Rodger). The House of Lords' conclusion that the European Convention
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actions on the streets of Basra. 300 To make matters more confusing, the
Canadian Appeals Court held in the Amnesty Internationalcase that under the
Bankovi6 test, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Duties did not apply to
claims asserted by Afghans detained by Canada in Afghanistan because Canada
did not have "effective control" over Afghan territory. 3 0' That result conflicts
with the House of Lords' decision in Al-Skeini.
The second difficulty with the effective control test is the all-or-nothing
approach that the European Court of Human Rights and the British House of
Lords have adopted. Both courts have reasoned that the Convention's
obligations must be applied in their entirety or not at all: they cannot be
302
"divided and tailored" according to the particular violation that has occurred.
This all-or-nothing test led the House of Lords and the European Court to
view effective control quite narrowly in both Bankovid and Al-Skeini. As the
House of Lords majority observed, "the idea that the United Kingdom was
obliged to secure observance of all the rights and freedoms as interpreted by the
European Court in the utterly different society of southern Iraq is manifestly
absurd." 303 Therefore, only where a European state exercises such full control
as to warrant the extension of all the rights contained in the European
Convention would any of those rights apply. This is precisely the conundrum
that the Boumediene Court sought to avoid in its case-by-case functional test.
The Bankovid and Al-Skeini decisions have been criticized for adopting the
view that the Convention applies in its entirety or not at all.304
One of the judges in the court of appeals decision in Al-Skeini suggested a
view of effective control that would take into account the particular right at
issue, and would thus allow the effective control jurisprudence to move closer
to the position urged in this Article. Judge Sedley recognized that he was bound
by the Bankovi6 opinion's rejection of the possibility that only certain
Convention rights applied to a particular situation, but disagreed with that
approach. For Judge Sedley, "[T]he nature of the breach may condition or
determine whether the responsibility of the State is extraterritorially engaged,"
and such responsibility need not apply to the full panoply of rights covered by
the Convention. 305 Sedley noted that it was particularly important that the issue
applies to the United Kingdom's custody of an Iraqi detainee at a military base in Iraq has been affirmed
by a Chamber of the European Court in another case involving the United Kingdom, on the grounds that
the United Kingdom exercised "total and exclusive de facto and subsequently de jure control" over the
base. Al-Saadoon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 61498/08, 1 88 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 2, 2010), available
at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink, then search for "AlSaadoon," then follow link to case title).
300. Al-Skeini, [2007] UKHL 26, [83]-[84] (Lord Rodger); id [92] (Lord Hale); id. [151] (Lord
Carswell).
301. See Keitner, supra note 278, at 91.
302. Al-Skeini, [2007] UKHL 26, [79] (Lord Rodger); Bankovi6 v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct.
H.R. 333, 175.
303. Al-Skeini, [2007] UKHL 26, [78] (Lord Rodger).
304. Keitner, supra note 278, at 101 n.273; see also Cleveland, supra note 18, at 264-65
(pointing out that the Bankovi decision is inconsistent in this regard with the jurisprudence of the InterAmerican Commission and the U.N. Human Rights Committee).
305. Al-Skeini v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2005] EWCA (Civ.) 1609, [201], [2007] Q.B. 140
[201] (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (Sedley, J.).
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in Al-Skeini involved the "right to life," suggesting that the negative nature (as
opposed to the affirmative obligations contained in the Convention) and
importance of that right should be taken into account. 30 6 Judge Sedley did not
believe that because the United Kingdom was unable to guarantee all of the
Convention rights in Iraq, "it is required to guarantee nothing."o To him, the
United Kingdom should 308
be required to abide by "essential civil rights," even in
the "near chaos of Iraq."
The Al-Skeini House of Lords decision has been appealed to the European
Court of Human Rights, which heard arguments in the case in June 2010.309 A
critical question that the Court may resolve is whether the Convention applies
extraterritorially only where the state exercises effective control over a territory
or particular place, or additionally where the state exercises authority and
control over an individual. The Court has, at times, held that the latter type of
control is sufficient, but has expressed concern that a broad ruling to that effect
would render the Convention applicable to virtually any governmental act
against an individual worldwide.3o One possible method of addressing that
concern is the approach taken in this Article and suggested by Judge Sedley in
the court of appeal in Al-Skeini, of limiting the rights applicable
extraterritorially to those which are "essential," nonderogable, or
fundamental. 3tH
In sum, these Canadian and European decisions support the use of
international law to inform the extraterritorial application of rights. In addition,
the difficulty that the European courts have encountered in determining the
circumstances in which a nation exercises "effective control" sufficient to
warrant the extraterritorial application of rights strongly suggests, as Judge
Sedley recognized in Al-Skeini, that the future development of extraterritorial
jurisprudence must analyze not merely functional factors such as the degree of
control exercised over a particular location, but also the nature of the
individual's interest affected by the government's action, and whether the
individual's right is one that is nonderogable in any circumstance under
international law.

306. Judge Sedley could "see good grounds of principle and of substantive law for holding that,
at least where the right to life is involved, [the Convention's rights] extend beyond the walls of the
British military prison and include the streets patrolled by British troops." Id. para. 205 (emphasis
added).
307. Id para. 197.
308. Id para. 196. Sedley pointed out that "[n]o doubt it is absurd to expect occupying forces in
the near-chaos of Iraq to enforce the right to marry vouchsafed by Art. 12 or the equality guarantees
vouchsafed by Art. 14," but that doesn't mean that no rights at all should apply. Id.
309. Oral Argument, Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 9,
2010), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Press/Multimedia/Webcasts+of+public
+hearings/webcastENmedia?&purl=20100609- 1/lang/.
310. Bankovid v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333,T 75.
311. The Court is troubled by the application of the Convention generally to extraterritorial uses
of force by European states, as in the situation that was presented by Bankovi6. One method of
addressing those concerns substantively would be to cabin the extraterritorial application of the
Convention in those situations to a deliberate targeting or killing of a civilian, akin to summary
execution.
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VI. THE APPLICATION OF A FUNDAMENTAL NORMS, INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPROACH TO POsT-BOUMEDIENECASES INVOLVING EXECUTIVE
DETENTION AND TORTURE

Several recent, post-Boumediene U.S. cases raising the question of the
Constitution's reach beyond our borders illustrate both the confusion courts
have faced in applying Boumediene's functional test as well as the potential
utility of an approach utilizing fundamental international norms to aid in
determining the applicability of constitutional norms to U.S. actions abroad.
This Part discusses the D.C. Circuit's application of Boumediene's multifactor
functional test to the petitions for habeas corpus brought by four foreign
nationals detained for over six years at the U.S. military base at Bagram
Airfield Military Base in Afghanistan, 312 and that court's treatment of313claims
that U.S. officials tortured aliens in Guantanamo, Iraq and Afghanistan.
A.

Bagram and ProlongedExecutive Detention Abroad

In the Bagram case, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, the district court opinion, the
appellate briefs, and the oral argument before the D.C. Circuit focused
extensively on the objectivc dcgrcc of control asserted by the United States at
Bagram, the duration of its presence there, and the potential practical
difficulties with asserting habeas jurisdiction over a base located within an
active war zone. 314 The district court grappled with the question of whether the
degree of control that the United States exercises over Bagram is more
comparable to Guantanamo Bay or Landsberg Prison in post-World War II
Germany, the prison where the Eisentragerpetitioners were detained. The court
concluded that the Bagram situation did not align squarely with either
Guantanamo or Landsberg, but that the United States did exercise sufficient
control to warrant the assertion of habeas jurisdiction.315 The court also found
that the process utilized by the military to determine whether detention was
proper fell well short of what the Supreme Court found inadequate at
Guantanamo, and that while the practical difficulties of applying habeas in a
war zone were greater than those involved at Guantanamo, they were still not
substantial enough to deny habeas review. Therefore, habeas review was
available for the three non-Afghan detainees, 316 but not the Afghan citizen
because of potential frictions with the Afghan government due to the possibility
that he would eventually be transferred to Afghan control.317
The district court recognized that "it may seem odd" that different
312. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009), rev'd, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
313. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
314. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205; Brief for Petitioners-Appellees, Al Maqaleh v. Gates,
605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 09-5265), 2009 WL 6043974; Brief for Respondents-Appellants, Al
Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 09-5265), 2009 WL 6043972; Transcript of Oral
Argument, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 09-5265).
315. AlMaqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 221-26.
316. Id. at 226-31.
317. Id. at 229-30.
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conclusions can be reached for different detainees at Bagram based on the
foreign nation of which they are a citizen, but found that to be a predictable
outcome of Boumediene's functional test.3 18 The court also believed that the
length of petitioners' detention without review "tacitly informed Boumediene's
analysis," but held that "[b]ecause the Supreme Court did not include the length
of detention in its explicit list of factors" the court could "not separately
consider that circumstance here" but merely could use it in some undefined
way to possibly "shade other factors." 3 19 On appeal, the government's brief
omitted virtually any mention of the length of detention, focusing exclusively
on questions of U.S. control over the base and the practical difficulties of
allowing habeas jurisdiction for detainees imprisoned on a base located in a
theater of war.320 In their brief, the detainees were thus forced to address
mainly practical and objective factors rather than the point that the detainees
had been held for over seven years without adequate process. 32 1
The district court also held that for those detainees who were
apprehended outside of Afghanistan, far from any Afghan battlefield and
brought to the theater of war to be detained at Bagram, the potential for
executive manipulation of the court's jurisdiction was a factor recognized by
Boumediene as supporting the assertion of habeas jurisdiction. 32 2 As already
noted, at the appellate oral argument, Judge Tatel claimed that the Boumediene
Court never mentioned that factor in its functional test, and that he did not "see
how, bound as we are by Boumediene ... we can sort of add that additional
factor." 323
The court of appeals reversed the district court, applying the three factors

set forth in Boumediene's functional test. 3 24 The court held that Bagram's
location in an active theater of war posed practical obstacles to the issuance of a
habeas writ and that the United States does not exercise de facto sovereignty
over Bagram; therefore the second and third factors set forth in the functional
test weigh overwhelmingly against affording habeas jurisdiction to detainees at
Bagram.325 Jurisdiction was denied even though the petitioners alleged that
they had been captured outside of Afghanistan, first detained at some unknown
facility, and then transferred to Bagram. In short, the court concluded that
persons detained by the U.S. government indefinitely for many years with little
or no due process who claimed to be civilians and not enemy combatants had
no right to seek habeas review to challenge their detention.
Two basic rationales underlay the circuit court's decision in Al Maqaleh.

318. Id. at 209.
319. Id. at 216-17.
320. Brief for Respondents-Appellants, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No.
09-5265), 2009 WL 6043972.
321. Brief for Petitioners-Appellees, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No.
09-5265), 2009 WL 6043974.
322. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 220.
323. Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, 51, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(No. 09-5265). Judge Sentelle appeared to express the same point. Id. at 45.
324. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 95-99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
325. Id. at 97-98.
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The first was a rejection of what the court termed petitioners' "extreme
understanding" that U.S. control of Bagram was "sufficient to trigger the
extraterritorial application of the Suspension Clause." 326 To the court,
petitioners' position would potentially lead to "the extraterritorial extension of
the Suspension Clause to noncitizens held in any United States military facility
in the world, and perhaps to an undeterminable number of other United Statesleased facilities as well."327 The court pointed out that it had engaged in an
extended dialogue at oral argument seeking "some limiting principle that would
distinguish Bagram from any other military installation," but counsel was
unable to produce such a distinction.328 The court therefore focused on the
nature and location of the Bagram Airfield Military Base, factors that carry
heavy weight in Boumediene's functional test and which the court found
strongly favored denying habeas jurisdiction. The Al Maqaleh court also
articulated a second underlying rationale to reject habeas jurisdiction: that since
the Bagram Airfield Military Base lies within a more active theater of war than
did the Landsberg Prison at issue in Eisentrager,to permit habeas jurisdiction
there would be inconsistent with Eisentrager, which was not overruled by
Boumediene.329

The basic problem with the circuit court's holding in Al Maqaleh is that it
discounted the importance of the petitioners' constitutional rights and interests
and viewed practical factors such as the location of the Bagram base in an
active war zone as virtually dispositive. The theory articulated in this Article
explains why the petitioners' interests should be weighed heavily in the
decision as to whether they can seek the writ: prolonged executive detention
without even minimal due process not only violates our own Constitution but
also contravenes a fundamental principle of international law.
Indeed, the petitioners did propose several limiting principles for habeas
petitions, but those limits were not based on distinguishing Bagram from other
secure U.S. military bases around the globe, but rather on distinguishing these
particular petitioners' interest from those of other detainees held anywhere in
the world. The petitioners proffered three distinctions: (1) they had received
little or no due process; 33 0 (2) they had already been detained for many yearsas was also the case with the Boumediene petitioners-and their detention was
indefinite and likely to extend for many more years; 3 3 1 and (3) they had been
transferred to Bagram from places of capture and detention that were not within
an active theater of war.332
The question of whether detainees at a particular military facility should
be able to seek the writ of habeas corpus should not turn primarily on the
location and characteristics of the particular military facility-assuming that

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id. at 95.
Id.
Id. (citing Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 323, at 30-47).
Id. at 97-98.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 40-41.
Id. 41.
Id 43-45.
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the facility is under U.S. effective control-but rather on the importance,
fundamentality, and universal recognition of the individual's right allegedly
denied by the government. That proposition is supported by the cases relied on
by Boumediene, particularly the Insular Cases and Harlan's concurrence in
Reid wherein he did not seek to distinguish one military base from another, but
rather capital crimes from other offenses.
"Freedom's first principles," relied on in Boumediene,333 should prohibit
the United States from indefinitely and possibly permanently detaining
individuals using a woefully inadequate process, particularly in an untraditional
war in which both logic and empirical evidence indicate that the risk of a
wrongful detention is significant. 334 The government certainly had a
"reasonable time" to determine whether the Al Maqaleh petitioners should be
detained as enemy combatants. The petitioners were detained in a secure
facility under U.S. effective control. Whatever practical difficulties might arise
in providing for review are both surmountable and far outweighed by the
detainee's interest in avoiding an arbitrary prolonged, indefinite, and perhaps
lifelong detention. 335
Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit rejected the limiting principles offered by
the petitioners that would avoid worldwide habeas jurisdiction for any prisoner
detained by the United States yet recognize jurisdiction for at least some
detainees at Bagram held for a prolonged time period without minimal due
process protections. The court recognized that the Bagram petitioners had been
accorded even less process than the Boumediene petitioners had received, but
discounted that factor when weighing it against Bagram's location in a war
zone.3 36 The court's opinion completely ignored the length of the petitioners'
detention, and indeed, at oral argument, Judge Edwards stated that a test that
allowed for federal jurisdiction over a habeas petition filed by a noncitizen held
for ten years without any process at Bagram would constitute "a big reach from
what the Supreme Court has said." 3 37 Thus, the length of detention and lack of
any process were essentially rendered irrelevant. As to the third distinction
affecting these specific prisoners-their capture and initial detention outside of
any active theater of war-the court recognized that a transfer of a detainee into
an active war zone might implicate the separation of powers rationale of
Boumediene. However, the separation of powers concerns would only arise if
333. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008).
334. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004). As of the beginning of 2010, of the
forty habeas cases involving Guantanamo detainees that have been adjudicated on the merits, district
court judges had granted the writ thirty-one times, a rate of over seventy-five percent. Baher Azmy,
Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 499500 (2010).
335. Where a national government has requested that one of its citizens detained by the United
States be transferred to its jurisdiction for criminal prosecution, the prudential factors set forth in Munaf
v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008), require the Court to decline to issue the writ. Moreover, in that
circumstance, the United States is not detaining the person indefinitely, but only for a reasonable time
pending transfer. The situation is quite different, however, where, as in Afghanistan, the government
does not claim that any particular individual will be transferred to Afghan control, but only that some
undefined subset of detainees will be transferred at some time in the future.
336. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 96-97.
337. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 323, at 54-55.
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the government was to "deliberately" transfer a detainee in a theater of war
instead of somewhere else in order to evade review.
The court's error in refusing to consider the length of petitioners'
detention can be highlighted by the following example. Suppose the U.S.
military decided to execute a prisoner detained at Bagram without any trial or
due process whatsoever. The court's opinion in Al Maqaleh v. Gates appears to
hold that habeas jurisdiction would not lie to hear a petition by the condemned
man who claimed he was an innocent civilian to stop a patently unlawful
execution, because Bagram is within the theater of war and not under the de
facto sovereignty of the United States. But such a result seems contrary to all of
the extraterritorial cases relied on by Boumediene and the Boumediene
decision's underlying rationale.
The Al Maqaleh circuit decision has thus been aptly criticized as creating
a law-free zone or legal black hole at Bagram. 338 The alternative approach
proposed here is consistent with both Boumediene and Eisentrager.339 Where
the detainee's interests are fundamental, as recognized by the international
community and the United States, they cannot be disregarded as cavalierly as
the D.C. Circuit did in Al Maqaleh simply because the detention facility lies in
a war zone.
The normative approach set forth in this Article would explain why
habeas review ought to be available for a prisoner contesting indefinite,
prolonged detention without any process that meets at least minimal
constitutional standards. The right to be free from prolonged arbitrary detention
without access to meaningful, timely, and effective judicial review is
universally recognized as a basis of all free governments. As the brief for the
petitioners in Rasul v. Bush argued, while the Court in Johnson v. Eisentrager

took pains to note that "[t]he practice of every modern Government" is to
refuse the protection of the "organic law" to enemy aliens convicted by a
military trial, in the twenty-first-century world, every modern government
condemns prolonged executive detention without legal process. 340 Te
authoritative Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law lists a "state policy
...

that practices, encourages, or condones . . . prolonged arbitrary detention"

as incompatible with nonderogable jus cogens norms. 3 4 1 While the right against
338. See supranotes I1-13.
339. The D.C. Circuit ignored the argument that the detainees in Al Maqaleh had interests that
differed from the interests of the petitioners in Eisentrager,which might have served to distinguish the
two cases. As Justice Kennedy explicitly pointed out in Boumediene, in Eisentrager, the German
prisoners had been accorded basic due process protections and there had been a rigorous, adversarial
process to test the legality of their detention. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 767 (2008). As the Al
Maqaleh court recognized, no such due process protections had been afforded the Bagram petitioners. Al
Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 96-97. To uphold the district court's decision would therefore require the court to
distinguish, rather than overrule, Eisentragerand to accord greater weight to the petitioners' due process
interests, as opposed to the location of the detention facility.
340. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 24, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 03-334)
The author helped in the drafting of the Petitioner's Brief. See also Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of
International Human Rights Law, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Nos. 09-5265, 095266, 09-5277), 2009 WL 6043975 (arguing that the prohibition against prolonged arbitrary detention is
a jus cogens norm of customary international law).
341.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

§ 702 cmt. n

& n.1 1 (1987).
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prolonged arbitrary detention is not listed as nonderogable in the major human
rights treaties, the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which monitors
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 34 2 the European Court
of Human Rights, 34 3 and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 34 4 have all
declared that the guarantee of judicial review of detention is a nonderogable
right which must apply even in times of war or national emergency. The
principle that "no person should be detained for an indefinite period of time"
requires that "[w]here persons are detained without charge, the need for their
continued detention shall be considered periodically by an independent review
tribunal."34 5
The Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain determined that a general
prohibition of any arbitrary detention "expresses an aspiration that exceeds any
binding customary rule having the specificity we require [to create] a private
cause of action" under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 34 6 The Court, however,
explicitly distinguished a state policy of prolonged arbitrary detention, which
while still not clearly defined, would at least in certain circumstances violate a
fundamental norm of international law.3 47
The primary questions to be answered in the pending Bagram case
therefore ought not to be related to the nature and duration of the U.S. control
over the Bagram Airfield Military Base, its location in a war zone, or the
practical difficulties in hearing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Rather,
the court should have determined whether a state policy of detaining
individuals for many years without minimal due process or court review where
their status is disputed implicates a fundamental nonderogable right recognized

342. The United Nations Human Rights Committee, which monitors compliance with the
ICCPR, has held that Articles 9(1) (prohibiting arbitrary detentions) and 9(4) (guaranteeing judicial
review of detentions) apply to all deprivations of liberty, and that Article 9(4) is nonderogable, even in
times of armed conflict. See U.N. Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, cmt. 8, 1 1, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.l
(1994); Human Rights Comm'n, General Comment 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), 16, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/2 1/Rev. 1/Add. 1 (Aug. 21, 2001).
343. The European Court of Human Rights has enunciated that the right of judicial review of a
claimed arbitrary detention is applicable even in times of a declared national emergency. See Ocalan v.
Turkey, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 238, 1142, 109-10 (2003) (requiring prompt judicial review of the detention
of an alleged terrorist accused of being responsible for thousands of deaths); see also Aksoy v. Turkey,
23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 553 (1996) (holding that, although Turkey had lawfully declared a national emergency,
it could not hold a suspected terrorist for fourteen days without judicial intervention); Chahal v. United
131 (1997) (ruling that concern for national security, though
Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413,
legitimate, "does not mean ... that the national authorities can be free from effective control by the
domestic courts whenever they choose to assert that national security and terrorism are involved").
344. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled that the right to judicial remedies,
including habeas corpus and other forms of judicial review available to detainees, are not derogable
because they are essential to protect all other nonderogable rights. Judicial Guarantees in States of
Emergency (Arts. 8, 25 and 27(2) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 9, 11 24, 41 (Oct. 6, 1987); Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations
(Arts. 7(6), 25(1) and 27(2) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 8, 1 42,44 (Jan. 30, 1987).
345. See United Nations Econ. & Soc. Council, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and
Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1 70, U.N. Doc.
E/CN/.4/1985/4, Annex (Sept. 28, 1984).
346. 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004).
347. Id.at 737.
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under both international law and the U.S. Constitution. If it does, the privilege
of petitioning for writ of habeas corpus should extend to any individual so
detained wherever he or she might be detained. At minimum, habeas should be
available absent compelling, overriding practical difficulties not of the
government's own making.
Several objections could be raised to the approach urged here. The first,
articulated by the D.C. Circuit, is that what I am advocating is essentially
worldwide habeas for any detainee imprisoned at a U.S. military base anywhere
in the world. That objection is, however, incorrect, for as already noted, only
those detainees who claim to be subjected to long-term prolonged detention
with only minimal due process are protected by what the Restatement
recognizes to be a fundamental, jus cogens norm of international law. However,
narrowing the class of detainees entitled to seek habeas in such a manner still
could require U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction over a great many potential
habeas applications, particularly in a case of a future full-scale war.
There are several other answers to the objection. The British already have
apparently accepted an even broader rule in the Al-Skeini case discussed in Part
IV, treating military bases analogously to embassies-and therefore as subject
to the European Human Rights Conventions proscriptions-thus covcring all
detainees held at British military bases. Moreover, in the kind of long-term
guerilla warfare we are currently waging in Afghanistan and elsewhere, where
the enemy is often indistinguishable from civilians, the risks of erroneous,
potentially permanent deprivation of a person's liberty should outweigh
practical problems of according a habeas hearing. In a future, potentially more
traditional war involving regular armies and thousands of prisoners of war,
virtually all the detainees are likely to be captured on the battlefield wearing
uniforms and thus presenting no serious habeas problems. Were a future army
to attempt to flood our courts with habeas petitions from such captured soldiers,
the courts could undoubtedly develop rules to allow those cases to be dealt with
summarily in a manner that is not significantly different from a jurisdictional
dismissal. Moreover, it is likely that in a situation involving thousands of
prisoners, many of those enemy prisoners would be held-as German prisoners
were during World War II-in the United States for security reasons, and thus
even under the D.C. Circuit's ruling would be entitled to seek habeas.
A second possible objection could be that it is not so clear that the norm
against prolonged executive detention without judicial process is a
nonderogable, jus cogens norm of international law. For example, the major
human rights treaties do not explicitly list that proscription as being
nonderogable, and the norms that are treated as jus cogens are not clearly set
forth in any international treaty or resolution. However, as already mentioned,
the authoritative Restatement of Foreign Relations lists prolonged arbitrary
detention as a jus cogens norm, and the European Court of Human Rights and
other international organs have treated the norm as nonderogable, even in war
or emergency situations, although the basis for that treatment is somewhat
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ambiguous. 348 Moreover, irrespective of the norm's technical status under
international law, our courts can certainly recognize that, unlike the warrant
requirement or a jury trial, the international community not only accepts the
norm as universal, but clearly treats it as having some sort of elevated or
fundamental status.
Finally, one can argue that the definition of "prolonged" confinement is
vague. When does a detainee's right to seek habeas commence: after one week
in detention, or one month, or one year? The European Court has treated
fourteen-day detention without judicial process as prolonged. 34 9 That time
period seems too short, however, in the wartime context that exists in
Afghanistan. One obviously cannot sharply define an exact time frame that
would constitute "prolonged," but it would seem that, once a detention has
stretched on for many months with no end in sight, it qualifies as prolonged.
The point is to distinguish battlefield detention and to accord the detaining
authorities sufficient time to determine whether the detainee should not be
released.
B.

The ExtraterritorialApplication of the ConstitutionalProhibitionof
Torture

The second major arena of conflict with respect to the application of
Boumediene's extraterritorial test is over the question of whether the
Constitution prohibits U.S. officials from engaging in torture or cruel and
inhumane treatment against aliens abroad. Lower courts have avoided
definitively deciding that question in several post-Boumediene opinions, and
the functional test may lead to confusion in analyzing the issue. The approach
suggested here presents a clear answer: the proscription against torture is
clearly a jus cogens nonderogable right, which ought to apply whenever and
wherever the U.S. government acts.
Prior to Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit and district courts in that circuit
had consistently held that the constitutional proscription of cruel and inhumane
punishment did not reach U.S. officials who tortured aliens abroad.3 so In Rasul
v. Myers, first decided by the D.C. Circuit just prior to the Supreme Court's
holding in Boumediene, the court reiterated that rule in dismissing a Bivens
damage action brought by former detainees at Guantanamo against high
government officials for alleged torture they suffered during their detention.35 1
The Supreme Court vacated the Rasul dismissal after the Boumediene
decision, ordering the D.C. Circuit to review its decision in light of
Boumediene.352 However, in Kiyemba v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit held that the
Court's Boumediene decision only involved the applicability of the Suspension

348.
349.
350.
351.
763 (2008),
352.

See supra notes 341-345 and accompanying text.
Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 Eur Ct. H.R. 553 (1996).
See supra note 173 and cases cited therein.
Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 663-65 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated and remanded, 129 S. Ct.
af'don remand, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
Rasul v. Myers, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008).
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Clause to Guantanamo and did not affect prior circuit law that the Due Process
Clause did not apply to aliens without property or presence within the United
States. 353 When the D.C. Circuit revisited Rasul, it noted that "the Court in
Boumediene disclaimed any intention to disturb existing law governing the
extraterritorial reach of any constitutional provisions, other than the Suspension
Clause." 354 While the court is technically correct that Boumediene explicitly
addressed only the Suspension Clause, Boumediene's extended discussion of
the Constitution's extraterritorial reach clearly undermined the circuit's prior
holdings that the Constitution simply did not apply to aliens tortured abroad.
The Court's review of its prior extraterritorial jurisprudence in Boumediene
made clear that "these decisions undermine the Government's argument that, at
least as applied to noncitizens, the Constitution necessarily stops where de jure
sovereignty ends." 355
The D.C. Circuit, however, chose not to rest its decision on the ground
that the Constitution does not apply to torture of aliens abroad, holding instead
that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, because reasonable
officials would not have known that the prohibition against torture applies to
Guantanamo until at least after Boumediene was decided in 2008. Indeed, the
court's dicta suggests that, even now, it is not clearly established that the
constitutional proscription against torture applies to Guantanamo or any other
U.S. military base abroad, and that U.S. officials who engaged in torture abroad
now would still be entitled to qualified immunity.356
The Supreme Court denied Rasul's petition for certiorari.357 Moreover,
the D.C. Circuit is poised once again to reject a damages action brought by
aliens for torture, this time by detainees allegedly tortured in Iraq and
Afghanistan whose claims were dismissed by the district court.3 " Thus, U.S.
officials who torture aliens abroad are effectively immunized.
The framework proposed here leads to three conclusions about this D.C.
Circuit line of cases. First, the proscription against torture is a paradigmatic jus
cogens, nonderogable norm of international law, and the constitutional
proscriptions against cruel and inhumane treatment should therefore be
applicable to U.S. actions against aliens abroad. Moreover, every nation in the
world, including the United States, has agreed as a legal matter that it is never
"practicable" to use torture, even during war or national emergency.359

353. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026-27 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235
(2010).
354. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
355. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755 (2008).
356. Rasul, 563 F.3d at 529 (stating that the circuit's prior law that the Constitution does not
apply to U.S. actions against aliens abroad remains undisturbed by the Supreme Court's opinion in
Boumediene, with the exception of the Suspension Clause which does apply in some circumstances).
357. Rasul, 563 F.3d 527.
358. Ali v. Rumsfeld, Nos. 07-5178, 07-5185, 07-5186, 07-5187 (argued Jan. 13, 2011). As
Judge Edwards said at oral argument in the Ali case: "You can't prevail under the law of the circuit. It's
not your fault." D.C. Circuit Appeals Ready To Void Torture Suit, BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Jan. 13,
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/201 1/01/dc-circuit-appeals-ready-to-void-torture-suit.html
2011),
(quoting Judge Edwards).
359. ICCPR, supra note 205, art. 4; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
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Second, it has for years been a clear violation of international law and

U.S. criminal law for a U.S. official to torture an alien abroad, and it violates
the Constitution to torture an alien detained here. Thus, the rationale for
according government officials qualified immunity for acts that a reasonable
official would not have known were unconstitutional at the time ought not
apply to this situation. 360 The torturer, like the state officials who utilized the
hitching post until recently, ought to have generally known that what they were

doing was without authority and thus unconstitutional.36 1
Third, the Supreme Court should take one of the cases involving this
issue and decide the underlying constitutional question of whether the
proscription against torture applies abroad, even if it ultimately decides that the
official is entitled to immunity. 362 Thus far, the Court has declined to review

several recent cases raising this issue.3 To do so is to effectively immunize
former or current officials from civil liability for acts that our government and

the world officially state are unacceptable.
VII. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene v. Bush rejected the Bush
administration's categorical position that aliens located abroad have no
constitutional rights. The Court's articulation, however, of a functional,
pragmatic test to determine whether a constitutional norm is applicable to U.S.

actions against aliens abroad is in considerable tension with the fundamental
norms jurisprudence that undergirds the opinion. In the first major application
of the Boumediene functional test, the D.C. Circuit utilized the test to reach a
result at odds with the normative underpinnings of Boumediene.
The Boumediene test must be reformulated to reintegrate the fundamental
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 202.
360. In Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 n.12 (1984), the Supreme Court held that "neither
federal nor state officials lose their immunity by violating the clear command of a statute or regulationof federal or of state law-unless that statute or regulation provides the basis for the cause of action sued
upon." However, in this context, the fact that federal criminal law, international law, and United States
treaty law all prohibit the torture of aliens abroad is not irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry. Those
provisions are highly relevant to the question of whether officials who torture had "fair warning" that
their conduct "shocks the conscience" and violates the Constitution. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.
730, 743-44 (2002) (noting that defendants' own regulation suggests that the defendants were "fully
aware of the wrongful character of their conduct"). That torture is universally condemned should
provide U.S. officials with fair warning that engaging in such activity is "antithetical to human dignity"
and "obvious cruelty." Id. at 745.
361. See Hope, 536 U.S. 730 (holding that state officials who tied prisoners to the hitching post
were not entitled to qualified immunity).
362. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009). In Pearson, the Supreme Court held
that lower courts ought to have the flexibility to decide the merits of whether a constitutional right
existed before deciding whether that right was clearly established for qualified immunity purposes. The
Court noted that it is often beneficial to order decisionmaking in this way, particularly "with respect to
questions that do not frequently arise in cases in which a qualified immunity defense is unavailable." Id.
The situation in which U.S. officials are sued for torturing aliens abroad falls into that category, because
such suits do not often arise in injunctive actions.
363. Arar v. Ashcroft, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010) (denying certiorari from the Second Circuit's
dismissal of Arar's Bivens action, which alleged that U.S. officials sent him to Syria to be tortured
there); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009) (dismissing
a Guantanamo detainee's damage action against U.S. officials for torture and illegal detention).
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norms strands of the opinion into a workable and principled test. The nature of
the alien's interest and right must be accorded more weight in the analysis as to
whether the right applies. To do so by utilizing international law's fundamental,
nonderogable norms to determine which constitutional protections apply abroad
would both allay the Court's practical concerns and ground its test on the
important normative principle that underlay its Boumediene opinion.

